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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Financial Crisis in the United States and Germany
The collapse in the market for exotic financial instruments, the
liquidity crisis in major financial institutions, and the government
bailouts in 2008 and 2009 illustrate the massive social cost of financial
risk taking. In 2007, the market experienced record downgrades in
mortgage-backed securities, including Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Other complex debt securities fueled unprecedented
1
bank write-downs. “Some AAA rated debt lost all its value.” January
2008 was the worst month for CDOs in more than 10 years with is2
suance of CDOs “grinding to a near halt worldwide.” Experts had
previously estimated the value of the CDO market at more than $2
3
trillion. As the value of CDOs fell, the market for them disappeared.
*
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1
Jody Shenn, CDO Market Is Almost Frozen, JP Morgan, Merrill Say (Update2),
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2008 3:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aCk0Qr1f2Eew&refer=home (“The slowdown of the more
than $2 trillion CDO market follows record downgrades in mortgage-linked securities last year.”).
2
Paul J. Davies, Trading in CDOs Slows to a Trickle, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/39f3e128-d808-11dc-98f70000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
3
See Yongheng Deng, Stuart A. Gabriel & Anthony B. Sanders, CDO Market Implosion And The Pricing Of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities 3 (Inst. of Real Estate
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These are only a few examples of what went wrong in the United
States in 2008.
Financial instability easily spreads from one institution to anoth4
er and then across national boundaries. The financial crisis of 2008
quickly spread to Germany, inflicting significant damage there even
before German banks suffered a second blow from the sovereign debt
crisis of 2010. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB), Westdeutsche
Landesbank (WestLB), Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB),
and Landesbank Sachsen AG (SachsenLB) cost the German taxpayer
5
the most, but many other German banks had also invested in CDOs
and other American financial instruments. The banks made these
investments through special purpose entities and other conduits in
foreign jurisdictions that held CDOs and other long-term mortgage
loans that had been financed with the proceeds of short-term financed Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and Asset Backed
6
Securities (ABSs). The German banks provided guarantees in the
7
form of credit enhancement and liquidity to the conduits, which
enabled the conduits to finance the long-term financial instruments
8
through the issuance of the short-term financial instruments. The
conduits that actually held these investments were located mostly out9
side of the jurisdiction of German banking supervision. The German banks’ own exposure to these investments through the guaranStudies,
Working
Paper
No.
2009-012,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1356630_code17741.pdf?abstra
ctid=1356630&mirid=5.
4
Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and
Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 608 (2009).
5
Marcus Lutter, Bankenkrise und Organhaftung, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW] 197, 199 (2009).
6
Asset Backed Commercial Papers (ABCP) are short-term investment vehicles
with a short maturity that is typically between 90 and 180 days. A financial institution
typically issues the underlying security of the ABCP. The ABCP notes are backed by
physical assets such as trade receivables and are generally used for short-term financing needs. See generally Swasi Bate, Stephany Bushweller & Everett Rutan, The Fundamentals of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE (Feb. 3, 2003),
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/moodysabcp.pdf.
7
See Lutter, supra note 5.
8
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) are financial securities that are backed by a loan,
lease, or receivables against assets other than real estate and mortgage-backed securities. See Timothy J. Riddiough, Optimal Design and Governance of Asset-Backed Securities,
6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 2, 121–22 (1997), available at http://research3.bus.wisc.edu
/file.php/136/Papers/1995-10-12_Optimal_Design_and_Governance_of_AssetBacked_Securities_Journal_of_Financial_Intermediation_.pdf.
9
Id.; see also Christian Kirchner, Combined Deficits of Corporate Governance and of
Financial Reporting in the International Financial Markets Crisis, at 5 (unpublished article) (on file with author).
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tees was often hidden and not included in their accounting. The inherent risk of the guarantees to the banks, however, became appar10
ent when the market for CDOs collapsed.
One of many examples of such investments was IKB’s involvement in so called Asset Backed Commercial Paper Programs (ABCP11
Programs).
In these programs American Banks sold long-term
12
mortgage and subprime loans to special purpose vehicles (SPVs). In
the case of IKB, its SPV, Rhineland Funding, transformed these subprime loans into short-term ABSs that were then sold to institutional
13
investors.
IKB and other German banks ventured into ABCPPrograms hoping to profit from refinancing American mortgage
loans. For example, a German bank, or more often its SPV, could
buy a 6% long-term mortgage loan from an American Bank and
transfer it into 4% ABCP while keeping the spread of 2%. A significant downside of this business model, however, was liquidity and resale risk—profiting through the spread only worked while the conduit (i.e. Rhineland Funding) found buyers for the ABCP it issued to
14
pay for the American mortgage loans it bought. The ABCP, unlike
the mortgage loans, was short term, posing significant liquidity risk if
new ABCP buyers could not be found to pay off ABCP holders that
15
wanted to cash out. To minimize liquidity and resale risk, and thus
attract buyers for the ABCP, IKB provided credit enhancements to
16
Rhineland Funding. In 2007, institutional buyers started to realize
10

Alexandra Krieger, Wie kam es zur Subprime-Krise, und wie gerieten Banken in die
Schieflage? Ursachen und Schlussfolgerungen für die Praxis am Beispiel der IKB Deutsche
BÖCKLER
STIFTUNG,
11–12
(Sept.
2008),
Industriebank
AG,
HANS
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_finanzinvestoren_ikd.pdf.
11
See generally Kirchner, supra note 9; Krieger, supra note 10, at 12–13.
12
JASON COX, JUDITH FAUCETTE & CONSUELO VALEZUELA LICKSTEIN, WHY DID THE
CREDIT CRISIS SPREAD TO GLOBAL MARKETS? pt.B.1.a (Univ. of Iowa Ctr. For Int’l Fin.
&
Dev.,
March
2010),
available
at
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/
ebook2/contents/part5-II.shtml (explaining how SPVs were used to issue asset
backed securities into the markets).
13
Krieger, supra note 10, at 13.
14
Id. at 18.
15
A Boom Amid the Bust, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2008, at 1 (“[Money funds] bought
much of the short-term debt propped up in structured finance. It was their sudden
withdrawal that caused the market in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to seize
up. And banks’ liquidity problems are largely the result of money funds’ recent reluctance to hold their debt.”).
16
Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor & Ian McDonald, Global Scale: Impact of
Mortgage Crisis Spreads—How Subprime Mess Ensnared German Bank: IKB Gets a Bailout,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1.
The affiliate IKB set up for bond investing five years ago is Rhineland
Funding Capital Corp. The purchases included bonds backed by subprime mortgages, those issued to home buyers with weak credit. It was
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the high-risk market environment in which they were operating and
17
began to pull out of the ABCP market. Without buyers for ABCP
Products, Rhineland Funding was forced to turn to IKB for the
18
agreed upon credit enhancement and liquidity.
This eventually
precipitated the demise of IKB and its bailout by the German Gov19
ernment. However, IKB was not the only German bank engaged in
America’s housing market. At the end of 2006 three German
banks—Deutsche Bank, IKB, and SachsenLB—were the leading bank
20
sponsors with outstanding ABCP. After accumulating $114 billion
of toxic assets in the mortgage market that are now of questionable
21
value, WestLB had to be bailed out four times.
Part of the problem was that U.S. financial institutions sometimes were less than candid in their selling efforts directed at German
banks. The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) accused
Goldman Sachs of conduct that amounted to fraud in selling CDOs
22
to IKB. In 2007, the Düsseldorf-based bank began talks with Goldman to invest in an instrument that would allow IKB to bet that hous23
ing prices would rise. The SEC complaint alleged that Goldman sys24
tematically defrauded IKB; in the SEC’s view, it did not matter that
IKB was a sophisticated investor because Goldman did not provide

a global circuit: Rhineland partly funded its bond purchases through
short-term debt issued to U.S. investors, such as a suburban Minneapolis school district and the city of Oakland, Calif. But Rhineland’s shortterm borrowings had to be renewed frequently. And when investors
realized that their collateral for the borrowings included U.S. subprime
mortgages, they shut off the spigot.
Id.
17

Id.
Ragnhild Kjetland & Ulrike Dauer, Credit Crunch: Markets’ Ride: Sachsen’s CEO,
Rest of Board To Depart in Subprime Fallout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at C2 (“In late
July [2007], IKB, whose main business is lending to small- and midsize German companies, announced it wouldn’t be able to cover liquidity needs and risks at the investment vehicle Rhineland Funding.”).
19
Krieger, supra note 10, at 35–36.
20
Id. at 12.
21
IKB, Credit-Crunch Chump, The Bigger Fools, THE ECONOMIST, April 24, 2010, at
72.
22
See Complaint at 20–21, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., filed,
No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf; Settlement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y July 14, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/judgment-pr2010-123.pdf.
23
See Complaint supra note 22, at 15–16.
24
See id. at 20–21.
18
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the objective investment advice IKB expected to get.
cally, the SEC complaint alleged that:

More specifi-

The fact that the portfolio had been selected by an independent
third-party with experience and economic interests aligned with
CDO investors was important to IKB. IKB would not have invested in the transaction had it known that Paulson [a hedge fund
manager who took the other side of the bet] played a significant
role in the collateral selection process while intending to take a
26
short position . . . .

The German government, which has not yet launched proceedings
against Goldman Sachs, has indicated that it is examining its relationship with Goldman Sachs although it is not yet prepared to limit its
27
dealings with the bank.
Many observers around the world have concluded that debt
markets failed to function properly in 2008 because of CDOs and
28
other problems. At least before the sovereign debt crisis of 2010,
much of the alleged market failure was blamed on risky banking
29
practices that originated in the United States. The experience of
German banks with CDOs, however, revealed that some of the nonU.S. victims were willing participants in the risk, even if they did not
always fully understand the risks. In fact, the SEC’s position in the
Goldman complaint is that at least with respect to the transaction at
30
issue, IKB did not understand important aspects of the risk. Banks
in England, Germany, and elsewhere also at times were facilitators
31
and enablers of risky practices in the United States. A U.K. Bank,
for example, assisted Lehman Brothers with its efforts to conceal debt
25

See id. at 15–18.
See id. at 17.
27
See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Confident on IKB Part of Goldman Suit, WASH. POST,
Apr. 24, 2010, at A7, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/23/AR2010042305223.html.
28
See Kara Scanell, SEC Steps up Probe of Crisis Deals by Fund, WALL ST. J., June 19,
2010, at A1 (noting that critics have said the crisis worsened when banks experienced
great losses due to CDOs they had incurred but could not sell).
29
See John Cassidy, Banks Must Pay for Market Failure, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 30, 2009,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/
6689145/Banks-must-pay-for-market-failure.
30
See Complaint at 17, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., filed, No.
10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf.
31
See Bill Buzenberg, Commentary; The Mega-Banks Behind the Meltdown—How Wall
Street’s Greed Fueled the Subprime Disaster, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, May 6, 2009 available
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/economic_meltdown/articles/
entry/1343 (discussing how the largest American and European banks were not victims of the financial collapse, but enablers).
26
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32

on its balance sheet through a transaction known as “Repo 105.”
Market failure and excessively risky banking practices have been widely recognized as a global problem and not just an American problem.
B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany

This Article makes some preliminary observations on how two
countries—the United States and Germany—are likely to deal with
this problem in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. As of the
publication date for this Article, regulatory and other measures are
being considered in both countries, and many of these measures have
yet to be approved or implemented. Detailed commentary will have
to wait.
We should also note at the outset that the concepts of “market
failure” and “excessive risk” are both controversial. Whether markets
fail and why they fail is one issue, and whether there is any such thing
as excessive risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is
another issue. Viewpoints on these questions will have a substantial
impact on how a policy maker—or a group of policy makers in a particular country—approaches regulation of risk in the banking sector.
The intent of this Article is not to advance a particular perspective on
these questions but to illustrate how attitudes toward markets and risk
in the United States and in Germany will likely affect the response to
the crisis of 2008.
33
Economists have long debated the theory of market failure.
Paul A. Samuelson defined the phenomenon of market failure and
32

A Repo 105 is an accounting practice that allows a bank to take massive liabilities off its balance sheet, thus making the bank look significantly healthier than it actually is. See Report of Anton R. Valukas at 737, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
No. 08-13555, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010). To call a repo a true sale based on
legal technicalities, however, a law firm needs to write a legal opinion. Id. at 783
n.3017. In Lehman’s case the bank was unable to find a U.S. law firm that would
provide such an opinion letter permitting the true sale accounting treatment. Id. at
783. In order to get the Repo 105 treatment, Lehman had to transfer the securities
involved to London where the transaction would take place and get a U.K. law firm
to provide the legal opinion. Id. at 784. Here, Linklaters, a magic circle law firm in
London, wrote the legal opinion for LBIE, Lehman’s European broker-dealer in
London, under English law. Id. at 784–86.
33
For a thorough discussion of the theory of market failure and most of the arguments pro and contra, see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS,
THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); PAUL A.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (6th ed. 1964); DAVID L. WEIMER
& AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1992); Louis De
Alessi, Error and Bias in Benefit-Cost Analysis: HUD’s Case for the Wind Rule, 16 CATO J.
129 (1996), available at https://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1/cj16n1-8.pdf;
Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. L. & ECON.
11 (1973); Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357 (1974);
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34

formalized it. Other economists later opined that Samuelson’s ar35
guments were, in many respects, fallacious. In some cases markets
could be inefficient because agreements within the market were not
36
enforced. Some economists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe
have been more skeptical about efficient markets than many of their
37
counterparts in the United States. Some economists in the United
38
States, however, have always been suspicious of market efficiency,
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1987); James
E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54
(1952); Richard R. Nelson, Roles of Government in a Mixed Economy, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
AND MGMT. 541 (1987); Charles Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107 (1979).
34
See SAMUELSON, supra note 33 (outlining basic economic concepts and market
theory).
35
See, e.g., THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988) (compiling a collection of primary critiques of market-failure theory
with suggestions on further research, including contributions from James M. Buchanan, Robert J. Smith, Robert Axelrod, Earl R. Brubaker, Steven N. S. Cheung, Harold
Demsetz, Jerome Ellig, Kenneth D. Goldin, and Jack High).
36
See NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 33, at 8 (“Governments take over the protection and enforcement of property rights because they can do so at lower cost than
private volunteer groups.”).
37
See Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, Fairness and Redistribution, 95
AM. ECON. REV. 960, 974 (2005) (noting that Europeans favor forms of government
intervention, whereas in the U.S., Americans favor limited regulation, which results
in more efficient market outcomes); Torben G. Anderson & Tim Bollerslev, Deutsche
Mark-Dollar Volatility: Intraday Activity Patterns, Macroeconomic Announcements, and Longer Run Dependencies, 53 J. FIN. 219, 219–21 (1998) (discussing that while the efficient
market hypothesis asserts that price changes reflect the availability of new, relevant
information, in Germany, the availability of such information does not explain overall volatility and what drives the German markets); Michael Melvin & Bettina Peiers
Melvin, The Global Transmission of Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market, 85 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 670, 679 (2003) (noting the possibility of arguing that the persistent
volatility in foreign exchange markets does not support the efficient market theory);
Kurt Richebacher, The Problems and Prospects of Integrating European Capital Markets, 1 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 336, 338 (1969) (proposing that because the U.S. has a
centralized market in New York, the market is highly efficient, but because Europe’s
market is decentralized, an efficient market solution for Europe “belongs in a utopian world”); Leland B. Yeager, Austrian Economics, Neoclassicism, and the Market Test,
11 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154 (1997) (asserting that Austrians consider the market system a complex arrangement that cannot be explained by an economic model but
rather by analyzing the organization of the economy from individuals to agencies);
Amir Amel-Zadeh, The Return of the Size Anomaly: Evidence from the German Stock Market
36 (Univ. of Cambridge, Judge Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 23/2006, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952472 (“Our findings
that firm-specific characteristics are able to explain some variation of stock returns
adds to the growing literature at odds with the efficient markets hypothesis and leads
us to seek salvation in behavioural [sic] explanation.”).
38
See generally ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT
MARKETS (1995) (arguing that the efficient market theory is unrealistic and presenting evidence supporting inefficient markets); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
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and others are now pointing to the events of 2008 as an illustration of
how markets can and do fail. Regardless of which perspective is correct, perspectives on market failure can affect both bankers’ business
practices and the policies of bank regulators. Bankers who believe
that markets fail may be more cautious when investing in markets,
and regulators who believe that markets fail may be more aggressive
when regulating markets. Different perspectives on markets and
their efficiency—or inefficiency—could be an important explanation
for different responses in the United States and Germany to the
events of 2008.
The credit crisis of 2008–2009 also convinced many observers
39
that the level of risk in the financial sector was excessive. In general,
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there was an enormous
amount of risk taking in financial markets in the years leading up to
2008. Some investors—usually agents investing other people’s money—traded in volatile financial instruments they only partially un40
derstood. Observers blamed risky investments for the downfall of
major financial institutions, destruction of markets for financial instruments, and widespread economic chaos. The more hotly debated
question, however, is whether bankers assumed too much risk in particular transactions and if so, how to define how much risk is too
much. Which particular decisions by bankers were excessively risky,
which were not, and how can one distinguish between the two?
Risk is not inherently bad, and indeed, the economy thrives on
some types of risk. Risk aversion can lead to suboptimal allocation of
41
resources and detriments to shareholders who demand high returns
42
on capital. Achieving an appropriate balance between risks that are
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the obsession with stock markets and its effect
on the market).
39
James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 421 (recognizing that in light of the recent crisis, critics’ concerns have focused on the role
of systemic risk in financial institutions and markets).
40
See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 (arguing that the lack
of understanding of certain financial instruments and the hierarchies in financial
institutions exacerbated the principal agent problem and contributed to the demise
of markets in financial instruments).
41
Markus Ruffner, Sorgfalts- und Treuepflichten und die Versicherbarkeit von
Haftungsrisiken in Publikumsgesellschaften – eine ökonomische Analyse, 119 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [ZSR] [JOURNAL OF SWISS LAW] 195, 213 (2000) (Ger.).
42
See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“Shareholders do not want (or should not rationally want) directors to be risk
averse. Shareholders’ investment interest, across the full range of their diversifiable
equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly
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informed and reasonable on the one hand and risks that are unreasonable or uninformed on the other is a challenge in managing a
business enterprise, particularly a financial institution. To the extent
regulators and courts are charged with monitoring financial risk in
private enterprise, achieving a balanced legal approach to risk is also
a challenge.
Corporate directors are charged with numerous tasks, and the
emphasis in the United States, and increasingly in other countries is
43
on maximizing shareholder wealth. In order to do their jobs, man44
agers often must take reasonable risks while avoiding excessive risk.
Distinguishing the two is a subject of much debate, a debate which
will intensify in light of recent events. Part of this debate is over how
much of a role the law—as opposed to shareholders, markets, or other mechanisms—should have in defining the difference between risk
that it reasonable and that which is not. If the law does intervene, a
second debate is over how the law should intervene—government
regulation of risk taking, mandatory disclosure rules that make
shareholders and other investors aware of risks, shareholder suits, or
other approaches.
Perspectives on the question of how much risk is too much risk
and the related question of how to regulate it are likely to shape the
attitudes of both bankers and policy makers. As discussed further in
this Article, perspectives on risk are different in the United States and
in Germany. The objective of this Article is not to discuss which
perspective on risk is the correct one but instead to point out that
perspectives on risk differ and that these differences are likely to affect both banking practices and regulation in the United States and
Germany.

assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.”).
43
See Dodge v. Ford Motors Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The power of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001)
(“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2065 (2001) (“[S]hareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles.”).
44
For a discussion on corporate responsibility and shareholder wealth maximization, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419–29 (2002).
See also FRANK E. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 104 (1991).
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In both the United States and Germany the response to risk has
included, and will likely include yet more, legal constraints on risk.
Neither country relies exclusively on cultural and business risk avoidance norms. As explained more fully below, reliance on risk avoidance norms of private actors may be more prevalent in Germany than
in the United States, but recent events have led both countries to be
suspicious of unregulated financial risk. Generally, the legal constraint comes in two parts: rules that restrict risk taking itself and disclosure rules.
Rules that restrict risk taking often focus on particular types of
risk—such rules include, for example, regulation of the investments
made by banks and capital requirements for banks. Proposals to require banks to separate certain trading operations, such as derivatives
from their regular banking operations, are an example of rules designed to limit risk taking in specific areas. Because of recent events,
more such rules will likely emerge in both the United States and
Germany in the near future.
Outside the scope of these rules that constrain specific types of
risk, the law can also incorporate a more general principle barring
managers from incurring risk that exceeds a certain standard. The
law does not do so in most instances because defining such a standard is difficult. Corporate law instead protects the risk decisions of
bank managers from challenge through a concept known as the
“business judgment rule.” The business judgment rule in both the
United States and Germany precludes judicial review of most decisions by corporate directors and protects directors from potential liability for “good faith” decisions, even if those decisions ultimately end
45
in failure. The rule creates a rebuttable presumption that directors,
while independent and disinterested, acted on an informed basis,
with a proper business purpose, and in the best interest of the corpo46
ration. Courts and legal commentators in the United States and
Germany have long emphasized the importance of the rule in promoting the kind of risk taking by corporations that results in new
ideas, new technologies, and new markets. As explained more fully
below, the business judgment rule is articulated differently in the
United States and in Germany, and there may be more latitude to
challenge some risky decisions in Germany, but in both countries the
rule is highly protective of corporate managers. Arguably, the busi45
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985); Aktiengesetz
[AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 93(1)–(2)
(Ger.).
46
See id.
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ness judgment rule finds a middle ground between excessive risk and
excessive risk aversion while taking into account the interests of
shareholders, corporate directors, and sometimes other constituencies. Alternatively, one could view the business judgment rule as being too deferential to management, and an indication that corporate
law is abandoning the field of risk regulation to more specific rules
aimed at specific types of risk in specific types of institutions.
The United States and German governments, as most other industrialized countries, enacted mandatory disclosure laws to facilitate
the flow of information about risks to investors. Registration statements in the United States, for example, have a separate section titled
47
“risk factors.” These laws do not seek to regulate risk taking, or even
to impose due care or other obligations on the risk takers, other than
the duty of disclosure. Policy makers and commentators in the United States and Germany debate how much disclosure should be required and what the consequences—government sanctions, civil litigation, or both—should be for failure to disclose. Historically,
disclosure obligations have been more robust in the United States
than in Germany, but Germany along with the rest of the E.U. is moving toward more disclosure. Furthermore, disclosure rules in the
United States, however robust, are sometimes ignored.
Finally, commentators on German and American approaches to
risk inevitably confront one of the most often debated issues in comparative law: whether there is convergence or divergence in legal
rules. In a global economy dominated by corporations as well as un48
incorporated entities, to what extent is the relevant law converging
49
or diverging in the world’s largest economies? Changes in the interpretation of the business judgment rule as well as legislative proposals pertaining to risk taking by managers in Germany and the
United States may illustrate a trend towards divergence in legal ap-

47

17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) (2009).
See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 2 (2010). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Uncorporating the Large Firm (Ill. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE08-016, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?absact_id=1003790 (discussing the increase in the use of uncorporations,
such as LLCs and limited partnerships, where large corporate firms previously dominated the corporate landscape).
49
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications (Colum. Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 144, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=142833.
48
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proaches. At the time of this writing, it is unclear how much divergence there will be between these two countries, and whether there
will be a later shift toward convergence when countries try to coordinate their rules on risk.
A closely related issue is whether there is a convergence or divergence in business practices. Will bankers respond to the events of
2008 differently in Germany than in the United States even in the absence of regulation? Will one or both countries experience more voluntary risk aversion on the part of bankers who have supposedly
learned their lesson?
German banks of course have also been affected by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010, which was triggered by rising government
debt together with downgrading of government debt in Europe. The
countries of most concern were Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
European countries and the International Monetary Fund agreed to
a €110 billion ($146 billion) loan to Greece conditioned on harsh
51
austerity measures. The ensuing crisis triggered a widening of bond
yield spreads and higher rates for risk insurance on credit default
swaps between the most adversely affected countries and other EU
52
member states. The apparent inability of German bank managers to
anticipate the implications of such a crisis until it was too late remains
a great concern.
While we recognize the importance of the sovereign debt crisis
and its implications for Germany, this Article will not address the implications of that crisis but will instead focus on the credit crisis of
2008–2009 and its effects on approaches to risk taking in Germany
and the United States. The overall German approach to risk taking,
however, may be affected by the fact that German banks, like American banks, have been exposed to the 2008 credit crisis, and unlike
their American rivals, German banks also face a second threat in their
exposure to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. This combination of factors could lead the German regulators and bankers themselves to impose stricter substantive rules for risk management in comparison

50

The authors do not intend to imply that there is a general trend toward divergence in corporate law. The Article merely analyzes trends in the approaches to risk
taking.
51
Kerin Hope, Nikki Tait & Quentin Peel, Eurozone Agrees €110bn Greece Loans,
FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3307762-5616-11df-b83500144feab49a.html.
52
David Oakley & Kerin Hope, Gilt Yields Climb on UK Debt Concerns, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2010), at 21, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d25573c-1ccc-11df8d8e-00144feab49a.html.
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stringent duty to monitor on board members will likely increase, but
it is not clear how much and how fast this cost will increase. The
three upward sloping solid lines illustrate some potential cost
changes. Costs could increase very quickly and then level off at a later point, or costs could instead increase more slowly and gradually.
At the same time, the cost of bad (e.g. excessively risky) business decisions that could have been avoided by monitoring decreases. We include alternative Lines 2a, 2b, and 2c because as discussed below,
from a cost perspective the way in which the monitoring requirement becomes more stringent matters. The mix between agency enforcement
and civil litigation matters; the mix between changes to substantive
and procedural rules matters; and the particular changes to rules also
matter. One particular combination of measures may create a sharply sloping line (Line 2b), whereas another may result in the more
gently sloping line in which costs rise slowly (Line 2c). The cultural
context also matters; a particular combination of substantive and
procedural rules in one setting—for example, the U.S.—may result in
a sharply rising solid line whereas the same combination in another
setting—for example, Germany—may result in more gently rising
costs, or vice versa. These differences are likely part of the explanation for why different countries have different approaches to directors’ duty to monitor for risk as well as other ways of constraining risk;
imposing a duty to monitor, or simply prohibiting certain types of derivative securities, for example, could be more costly for financial institutions in one country than in another.
The dashed downward sloping line (Line 1) shows the effect
of a more stringent monitoring requirement on mitigating costs directly attributable to excessive risk taking. These costs should decline
as the monitoring requirement becomes more severe. We only in54
clude one dashed line. Conversely, the costs of bad business decisions rise when the severity of the monitoring requirement decreases
because substantive standards of care are loosened and/or procedural rules become more favorable for directors accused of violating the
standard. Less stringent procedural rules include less vigorous agency enforcement, higher burdens of proof to show a violation, and less
private civil litigation. With a less stringent monitoring requirement,
the cost of imposing a duty to monitor on directors also may decrease
as shown by the left portion of Lines 2a, 2b, or 2c. The cost of bad
54

This is an oversimplification because a given level of risk deterrence may still
have a different impact on the company’s costs from excessively risky decisions depending upon what specific types of risks are avoided; some risks are more costly to a
company than others.
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business decisions that could have been avoided by monitoring, how55
ever, increases as shown in Line 1.
Presumably, the total costs involved would be a combination
of upward sloping (solid) and downward sloping (dashed) lines.
Given the multitude of unknown parameters, we dispense with showing a total cost line. Our objective is not to identify a formula for calculating the ideal level of severity for a monitoring requirement or an
ideal level of deterrence of risk. Instead, our point is that different
combinations of substantive rules and procedural rules and practices
affect both types of costs (costs of monitoring and the cost of bad
business decisions) differently. As discussed more fully below, an important factor is where—the United States, Germany, or somewhere
else—a particular combination of substantive rules and procedures is
implemented and how they are implemented. Different countries
make different choices about whether and how to impose a duty to
monitor risk and to what extent. They make these decisions within
different institutional frameworks, and sometimes there are good
reasons for these decisions.
III. CULTURAL COMPONENTS OF RISK TAKING AND CONTROLLING RISK
Risk taking can be intentional or unintentional. Examples of
intentional and sometimes ill-informed risk taking include investments in risky real estate deals in the 1980s and the purchase of some
CDOs and other mortgage-backed securities by investment banks and
institutional investors prior to the 2008 credit crisis. Examples of unintentional risk taking include miscalculations in valuation models or
algorithmic trading. While unintentional risk taking can impose additional costs on the institutions that incur it because of the added
element of surprise, both intentional and unintentional risk taking
can be costly, and sometimes more costly than the benefits derived
there from.
Countries where bankers do not typically embrace intentional
risk taking are still vulnerable to collateral effects of intentional risk
taking in other countries as well as unintentional risk taking in their
own financial institutions. Regulation and business practices intended to control risk in such countries may be designed principally
to address these problems, including, for example, rules that limit
multinational banks’ activities and rules that limit certain types of
trading. Arguably, Germany is one such country; although, as illu55
Although we show only one dashed Line 1, we recognize that the dashed line
may slope upward to the left in varying ways depending on the types of risks that are
incurred more often because of less stringent monitoring requirements.
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strated by the active participation of German banks in CDOs, a lot of
intentional risk taking has recently taken place in Germany, and the
German response to the 2008 crisis will likely address this problem.
Countries where bankers typically embrace intentional risk taking
may focus management reform and regulation on curtailing incentives for risk taking, such as compensation arrangements that encourage bankers to take too much risk. The United States falls into this
category.
Discerning excessive risk from other risk is highly subjective
and an analysis likely to be undertaken differently in different cultural contexts. In most cultural settings, risk taking is not viewed as excessive simply because the risk did not pan out and somebody lost
56
money. Hindsight bias nonetheless can have a powerful influence
on the definition of excessive risk. Hindsight bias and other conceptual approaches rooted in past experience—including valid lessons
learned from past experience—may exert a more powerful influence
in a country that is otherwise predisposed to be concerned with its
past and not repeating the mistakes of its past. On the other hand, in
a country that is not so concerned with the past and predisposed to
view the future as being different from the past, experience may exert
less influence over conceptions of risk. In such a country, the lessons
of the past—whether the financial turmoil of the 1930s or more recent experiences—may be more easily forgotten or dismissed as irrelevant. Future observers are more likely to view the events of 2008 as
unique rather than a modern rendition of what happened in financial bubbles from an earlier era. A different perspective on the past is
56
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch.
2009) (stating that Delaware courts have developed doctrines such as the business
judgment rule because of “the inadequacy of the [c]ourt, due in part to a concept
known as hindsight bias, to properly evaluate whether corporate decision-makers
made a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decision”)
When one looks past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and red
flags used to dress up these claims, what is left appears to be plaintiff
shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in
hindsight, turned out poorly for the company.
Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 989 (2009); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 65 BUS. LAW.
193, 210 (2009) (citing In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at
124) (summarizing legal developments in corporate compliance in 2009 and noting
that Delaware Courts have developed doctrines to “properly focus on the decisionmaking process rather than on a substantive evaluation of the merits of the decision .
. . due in part to a concept known as hindsight bias”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, A Positive
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 621 (1998) (“The
business judgment rule arises from the concern that even a good decision can produce an undesirable result and can be judged unfairly in hindsight.”).
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one of many respects in which the United States and Germany may
be different.
The predominant unit of analysis for defining excessive risk—
the individual risk bearer or society as a whole—can be different in
different cultural contexts. One approach to defining excessive risk
that is prevalent in United States jurisprudence is the “prudent person” standard, which focuses on the individual: risk is excessive if a
reasonably prudent person would not incur that risk in the manage57
ment of his or her own portfolio. In keeping with this approach,
one of the authors of this Article has suggested that excessive risk
could be controlled by making sure that investment bankers are in
58
fact managing their own portfolios.
Another approach is to define excessive risk not by looking to
59
the individual but by examining externalized social cost of risk. Ronald H. Coase described social cost as “those actions of business firms
60
which have harmful effects on others.” Here, social cost can be nar57
See Stamp v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“In
addition to their fiduciary duty to the corporation, corporate directors must exercise
. . . the degree of care which prudent men . . . would exercise in the management of
their own affairs.”). In establishing a prudent person standard,
[S]ome courts take the view that it is a degree of care which prudent
persons, prompted by self-interest, would exercise in the management
of their own affairs. Other courts . . . stat[e] that the care which a director of a corporation is bound to exercise in the performance of the
director’s position is such care as a prudent person should exercise in
like circumstances.
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1467 (2010); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §
2-405.1(a) (West 2010) (codifying the broader prudent person standard).
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee of the board on which he serves:
(1) In good faith;
(2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation; and
(3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
Id.
58
See Claire A. Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests:
Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV.
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510443.
59
See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1239 (2002) (“Since we lack the ‘control set’ of
an industrialized regime without limited liability, the extent of the overinvestment in
this type of excessively risky activity remains an empirical question that is difficult to
answer precisely.”); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 50 (“Externalization of risk imposes social costs and thus is undesirable.”).
60
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960). “In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total
effect.” Id. at 44.
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rowly defined by looking to identifiable individuals who are affected
by excessive risk taking and asking if they are in a position to protect
themselves. Excessive risk as externalized social cost would comprise
any economic transaction involving a significant likelihood of a substantial economic loss being imposed on a party who is not directly
involved in the transaction (we will leave aside for the moment what
exactly is a “significant likelihood” or a “substantial economic loss”
and how these two factors might relate to each other). A broader definition of social cost looks to the overall impact on a society of losses
incurred by multiple parties because of risk, including the impact on
society from fear of further losses, political destabilization, ethnic and
national prejudices that might be engendered by financial losses and
other adverse effects on the social fabric. If Germany is more concerned about these broader questions than the United States, Germany may prioritize the social unit of analysis over the individual unit
of analysis and as a result define excessive risk differently.
Yet another factor influencing attitudes toward incurring risk
as well as regulating risk is differing attitudes toward personal responsibility. To what extent should individual bankers be seen as personally accountable for the losses they inflict on others? A related question is personal liability. Should individual bankers be liable and if
so, when? One explanation for excessive risk taking could be that
bankers are incentivized to make excessively risky investment decisions if they are protected by limited liability. Limited liability arguably increases the probability that a corporation may not have suffi61
cient assets to pay its creditors. Accordingly, both managers and
shareholders of a corporation enjoy most of the benefits of excessive
62
risk taking but do not bear all of the costs. Arguably, incentives
should be realigned by assigning liability to corporate directors or the
63
64
highest-ranking corporate officers or the controlling shareholders.
Solutions that impose personal liability, however, run the risk of de-

61

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 49–50.
See id. at 50–52.
63
See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 433 (2004); Hill & Painter, supra note
58 (proposing that the most highly paid investment bankers have strict liability for
some firm debts as they did in the days of general partnerships).
64
Mendelson, supra note 59, at 1203 (noting that controlling shareholders would
be first and foremost suitable for personal liability as they have “lower information
costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking [sic], and greater ability to
benefit from corporate activity”).
62
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terring reasonable and non-excessive risk taking. The purpose of
this Article is not to debate the merits of these different approaches
but to point out that societies that emphasize personal responsibility
may be more likely to hold individual bankers legally liable for their
mistakes than those that do not. Societies that emphasize personal
responsibility are also more likely to view corporate officers and directors as being an appropriate focus of regulation and, in appropriate circumstances, legal liability. Societies that deemphasize personal
responsibility are more likely to focus principally on regulating the
banks and other financial institutions than the individual bankers. As
of this writing, there appears to be some acknowledgment of personal
responsibility of bankers for excessive risk in both the United States
and Germany with some concrete proposals directed at individual
bankers at least in Germany. So far, however, both countries have focused primarily on the institutions rather than the individuals.
Appetite for risk also has a cultural dimension. Different cultures perceive risk taking differently. For instance, the business culture in the United States has traditionally been associated with a
more entrepreneurial spirit, which is linked with an increased willingness to take risks in order to attain a higher return. New companies, including new financial services firms, also rise to the top relatively quickly in the United States, and some old names, such as
Salomon Brothers, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, precipitously
fall. Long-term relationships between banks and their corporate customers used to be important in the United States but these relationships have become less important in an increasingly competitive and
more fluid market for banking services. The German culture, on the
other hand, has been associated with an emphasis on control of financial institutions by larger financial institutions. Longstanding
banking relationships also are still very important in Germany. For
instance, German companies have traditionally had a very strong relationship with their banking institution, the so-called Hausbank—a relationship in which the bank furnishes capital required to run a business and watches the business closely to make sure the capital is used

65
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 45 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(finding that personal liability may be a deterrent, assuming that “all individuals are
averse to sufficiently large risks [and] the risks are large compared with the [individual’s] wealth.”). See also EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 189–
203 (1998).
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well. Since the days of the hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s,
German bankers also have had a dislike for risk and for the economic
and political consequences that ensue from instability in financial
markets. Bankers who incur excessive risk and inflict excessive risk
on others probably are not as well liked in Germany as they are in the
United States, although the younger generation of German bankers
may be more similar to their American counterparts. Some of the
American risk-taking culture memorialized in Michael Lewis’s 1989
67
book about Salomon Brothers, Liar’s Poker, spread to Germany by
the 1990s. Still, the risk-preferring culture was not as deeply embedded in Germany as it was in the United States or even the United
Kingdom. After the disastrous developments of 2008 and 2010, Germany may return to its historical aversion to financial risk.
Incentive structures are yet another relevant factor that may
encourage risk taking by banks’ officers and directors. For instance,
the United States has developed a corporate governance structure
that emphasizes periodic disclosure of performance data and max68
imization of stock price. Risk taking in this context may be encouraged by the perceived need to satisfy expectations of shareholders.
Managers feel compelled to fulfill performance expectations whenever results are disclosed, be it quarterly, bi-annually, or annually. The
German business culture has traditionally not emphasized disclosure
and stock price as much as growth in the size and prestige of a banking corporation, its sustainability, and long-term client relationships.
Risk taking still occurs in this context, but it may be driven not so
much by meeting disclosure expectations and generating compensation related performance data and more by a desire to increase the
size and power of the corporation and its position in the global mar69
ket place, particularly Europe. For German bankers, growth in size
and prestige of their banks may bestow the most substantial boost to
the managers’ standing in business and social circles as well as perhaps their compensation.
Corporate law itself is also a factor in how risk is monitored
and controlled. Corporate law in the United States focuses on regulation of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.

66
In November 1923, the interest rate for call money on the Berlin Stock Exchange was 30% per day at times. SIDNEY HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 465
(1960).
67
MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989).
68
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
69
This might explain why German banks have suffered immense losses from
their efforts to build relationships with EU sovereign debt issuers such as Greece.
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German corporate law, for historical reasons, emphasizes the regulation of conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Arguably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling
and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with managerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.
On the other hand, U.S. corporate law centers so much on conflicts
of interest between shareholders and managers that managers are
given enormous latitude to exercise unfettered business judgment
when there is no demonstrable conflict of interest. Risk taking is one
of those situations where U.S. corporate law assumes that managers’
and shareholders’ interests are aligned, or at least not sufficiently divergent that legal intervention is justified. Thus, perhaps for different reasons, corporate law in both countries may have little to say
about the problem of excessive risk.
Governance mechanisms are also different. U.S. corporations
are subjected to the supervision of a single board of directors. The
German Aktiengesellschaft, or stock corporation, on the other hand,
has a two-tier governance structure. The first tier of supervision is the
Vorstand, or management board, comprised of persons who work
full-time for the company and are usually its most senior officers.
The second tier is the Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory board. In theory,
the rights and duties of the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat are strictly
separated. The German Aktiengesetz, or Corporation Act, allows the
71
supervisory board to supervise the management board, i.e. to oversee the management of the corporation and to co-approve all impor72
tant transactions, represent the Aktiengesellschaft in dealing with
73
the management board, request reports on recent business activity
74
or planned initiatives, and inspect the books and records annually.
The Aufsichtsrat also appoints the members of the Vorstand, who are
75
officers of the corporation, and can remove them from office. The
70
Historically, German corporations evolved in an environment of control—a
controlling majority shareholder or a multitude of large shareholders—through individual families. The Piech family of BMW is still a good example. For more information on voting power concentration in Germany, see Marco Brecht & Ekkehart
Böhmer, Ownership and Power in Germany, in CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 128
(Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001).
71
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I
at 1089, § 111(1) (Ger.).
72
The articles of association for each Aufsichtsrat further specify these functions.
73
AktG § 112.
74
AktG § 90(1).
75
Removing officers and board members before their term expires—the customary term being five years—requires cause, such as a material breach, incapacity, or
a vote of no-confidence at the shareholder’s meeting.
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primary oversight function of the Aufsichtsrat is to limit self-dealing
by managers and controlling shareholders. Secondly, through the
appointment of Vorstand members, continuous evaluation of their
performance, and the occasional removal of inefficient or underperforming members, the Aufsichtsrat monitors the performance of the
Vorstand.
76
Under various codetermination acts, the supervisory board is
not entirely composed of the shareholders’ representatives. Depending on the total number of employees of the corporation, the law may
require the representation of members of the workforce on the supervisory board. In German corporations with more than two thousand employees, the shareholders appoint half of the Aufsichtsrat
and the employees appoint the other half. In corporations with between 500 and 2,000 employees, the corporation’s employees appoint
one-third of the Aufsichtsrat. Although the chairman of the Aufsichtsrat has additional voting rights that can sway the Aufsichtsrat in fa77
vor of the representatives of the majority shareholders, a codetermined Aufsichtsrat can make the decision-making process more
cumbersome. Employee representatives may also feel that they
represent the political objectives of unions as well as the interests of
the company. It may be difficult for a co-determined Aufsichtsrat to
respond quickly to rapidly changing developments, such as an escalation of financial risk in a securities portfolio or a liquidity crisis.
The impact of codetermination on corporate governance in
Germany and on the market returns of German corporations is un78
clear. The impact on risk is also unclear. It is possible that the Auf76
See, e.g., Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichträten und Vorständen der Unternemen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl
erzeugenden Industrie [MontanMitbestG], May 1951, BGBL I at 347 (Ger); Gesetz
über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer [Mitbestimmungsgesetz—MitbestG],
May 4, 1976, BGBL II at 1153, § 9 (Ger.).
77
The chairman can make the tie-breaking vote. See Theodor Baums & Bernd
Frick, The Market Value of the Codetermined Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 206, 209 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
78
See Martin Henssler, Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im deutschen Gesellschaftsrecht, in
UNTERNEHMENS-MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER IM RECHT DER EUMITGLIEDSTAATEN [EMPLOYEES’ CO-DETERMINATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION] 133, 147–48 (Theodor Baums & Peter Ulmer eds., 2004) (Ger.);
Thomas Raiser, Bewährung des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes nach zwanzig Jahren?, in
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND MEDIENRECHT IN DER OFFENEN DEMOKRATIE. FREUNDESGABE FÜR
FRIEDRICH KÜBLER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 477, 491–92 (Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al.
eds., 1997) (Ger.); Rüdiger von Rosen, Kapitalmarkt und Mitbestimmung, in
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EBERHARD
SCHWARK 789, 793–94 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2009) (Ger.); Dieter Sadowski,
Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, Gesetzliche Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Idee,
Erfahrungen und Perspektiven aus ökonomischer Sicht, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS-
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sichtsrat may have too many members for effective monitoring of risk,
and the legally determined size of the Aufsichtsrat could curtail its
79
supervision of management decisions. The Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), or German Law on the
Appropriateness of Executive Compensation, improves the responsibilities of the Aufsichtsrat with regard to internal control and risk
80
management. Regardless of these recent improvements, codetermination may be a cumbersome vehicle for monitoring financial risk
in German companies.
On the other hand, the legal duties of Aufsichtsrat members
may weigh in favor of mitigating risk. The legal duties of the Aufsichtsrat derive from the duty of loyalty that each member of the Aufsichtsrat owes to the corporation. German courts have concluded that
the purpose of these legal duties is not to protect the shareholders as
81
the only constituents but to protect the interests of the firm. Codetermination in Germany further supports this perspective. Non-

UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] [JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW] 110, 126–132 (2001)
(Ger.). See generally Gregory Jackson, Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in
the Evolution of German Codetermination, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMICS 229 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds.,
2005); Mark J. Roe, German Co-Determination and German Securities Markets, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 361 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863
(2004); Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards (Maastricht Univ., Working
Paper No. 1171, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID552822_code98845.pdf?abstractid=534422&mirid=1; Gregory Jackson, Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance,
Unionism and Political Institutions, 12 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN, no. 3, 2005, available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID800525_code287864.pdf?
abstractid=800525&mirid=2; Wolfgang Schilling, Wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmung im
Meinungsstreit, 128 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSCRECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] [JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS LAW] 217, 219–227
(1966) (Ger.); Oliver Stettes, Unternehmensmitbestimmung in Deutschland—Vorteil oder
Ballast im Standortwettbewerb?, 52 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 611, 611–18 (2007)
(Ger.); Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J.
COMP. L. 79, 79 (1980); Christine Windbichler, Arbeitnehmerinteressen im Unternehmen
und gegenüber dem Unternehmen—Eine Zwischenbilanz, 49 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG]
[Joint Stock Company] 190, 191 (2004) (Ger.).
79
See Jan Lieder, The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism, 11
GERMAN L.J. 115, 151–52 (1988). The size of an Aufsichtsrat is negatively correlated
with the frequency of Aufsichtsrat meetings—i.e., smaller Aufsichtsrat meet more
frequently. Less frequent coordination of the Aufsichtsrat in meetings and collective
action problems may make supervision of risk taking of the Vorstand less effective.
80
Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [VorstAG], June 19, 2009,
BGBL I, at 2509 (Ger.).
81
See, e.g., 64 BGHZ 325 (329) (1975) (Ger.).
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shareholder constituencies, such as employees and creditors, are often more averse to risk than shareholders, particularly diversified
shareholders who can afford to see some companies fail if others do
spectacularly well. The Aufsichtsrat’s legal duty of loyalty to the firm
as distinct from its shareholders thus may dictate a more conservative
attitude toward risk than that of a shareholder oriented board of directors in the United States.
The Aufsichtsrat is also different from the board of directors
in the United States in that the Aufsichtsrat is primarily comprised of
people who either work for the company, or work for banks, insurance companies, or other financial institutions with strong business
ties to the company. The American concept of an “independent” director is relatively foreign to Germany—a difference between the two
countries’ governance regimes that came to the fore when German
companies with securities listed in the United States struggled to
comply with the heightened independence requirements for direc82
tors and audit committees in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. German Aufsichtsrat members may be more familiar with the business of
the company than their American counterparts, but they rarely meet
the American standard of independence, which emphasizes a direc83
tor’s lack of financial ties to the company. Recent events suggest
that the United States might not have much to show for the particular type of independence it has insisted upon, making it even less
likely that Germany and other countries will conform to U.S. corporate governance norms in this respect. The recent failure of “independent” director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S.
financial firms suggests that independent directors cannot effectively
monitor for risk if they are kept in the dark by the firm’s managers,
accountants, lawyers, and other persons familiar with its business.
Unless the United States changes its approach to independence, this
82

See Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards Through
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DUKE L.J. 833, 842–43 (2003)
(noting that since Germany’s Stock Corporation Act serves to minimize the problems
targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it would be costly and inefficient for Germany to
reconcile the regulations imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Germany’s Stock
Corporation Law); Klaus J. Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron 461 (European Corporate Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 05/2002, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=356102 (recognizing that the independence requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may create considerable problems for Germany in
light of its two-tiered board system and labor codetermination). See generally Georg
Lanfermann & Silja Maul, Auswirkungen des Sarbanes-Oxley Acts in Deutschland, 55 DER
BETRIEB (DB) 1725 (2002) (Ger.). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is located at Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
83
See Hopt, supra note 82.
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is an area where corporate governance norms in the United States
and Germany may continue to diverge.
United States and German methods of raising equity capital
and debt financing also differ. U.S. corporations rely heavily on capital markets, whether for selling their stock, long-term bonds, or shortterm commercial paper. This makes U.S. companies particularly vulnerable to market conditions and thus to financial risks that correlate
84
with markets.
This may also make managers of U.S. companies
more aware of market conditions and in some circumstances more
aware of market risks. Historically, U.S. companies have relied on
markets for financing more than they have relied on each other,
meaning U.S. managers are perhaps less aware than they should be of
the risks that are being incurred by companies other than their own.
With the growth of markets for swaps and other complex instruments, however, the fate of U.S. companies is directly vulnerable to
conditions at other companies in addition to overall market conditions. For example, several companies, including Goldman Sachs,
were owed billions of dollars by AIG—money they were paid only after the federal government bailed out AIG. U.S. managers, who were
not used to assessing levels of risk in companies other than their own,
may not have been prepared for this.
Because of their reliance on capital markets, U.S. companies
also are vulnerable to short-term demands of shareholders. Managers struggle to meet shareholder expectations, and sometimes incur
risks when they feel it is necessary to satisfy shareholders. The longterm health of the company may be secondary and the interests of
creditors, who are not represented in the boardroom, also may be
given less attention.
German companies, by contrast, rely on a combination of
public markets and institutional financing for capital. Historically the
emphasis has been on bank financing. Managers of one corporation
have a direct interest in risks assumed by other corporations. German managers have developed a method for monitoring each other’s
risks through interlocking boards of directors, cross-ownership of
large blocks of shares, and other mechanisms. How effective these
mechanisms are in helping directors monitor for risk is debatable.
But on its face, the German system of corporate governance appears

84

In 2008 a severe liquidity crisis occurred, and investors for a time stopped buying commercial paper. Edmund L. Andrews & Michael M. Grynbaum, Fed Announces
Plan to Buy Short-Term Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/08/business/08fed.html?ref=commercial_paper.
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to facilitate the flow of information about different companies as well
as the influence of different companies upon one another.
For all of the reasons discussed above, it is not surprising that
Germany and the United States have very different ways of approaching risk in the banking sector. Germany and the United States are
likely to follow different paths in defining “excessive risk” and in their
legal, institutional, and social mechanisms used to control risk.
IV. SOME SPECIFICS ON THE U.S. AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO
EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING BY DIRECTORS
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Decisions of directors about business risks, if challenged in
court, are analyzed under the business judgment rule in both Germany and the United States. The business judgment rule is a concept
in corporate law, whereby “directors of [a] corporation are clothed
with [the] presumption . . . of being [motivated] in their conduct by
a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the
85
stockholders have committed to their charge.” Unless the presumption has been rebutted, courts refuse to second-guess the actions of
directors in managing the corporation, unless it is shown that the directors were grossly negligent in violating their duty of care to man86
age the corporation to the best of their abilities.
87
Germany, among other nations, modeled its business judgment rule after the American business judgment rule. Some of the
countries that adopted the American business judgment rule, such as
88
Australia, have introduced a statutory business judgment rule. In
Germany, the business judgment rule is code based in the Aktienge89
setz (AktG). The business judgment rule in the United States by
85

Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924).
Another approach is to articulate the presumption that the directors acted
with due care, or “on an informed basis,” as part of the presumption of the business
judgment rule itself, a presumption which can then be rebutted by a plaintiff challenging the directors’ actions. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964
A.2d 106, 124 (2009).
87
Australia, for example, decided to implement the business judgment rule into
their Corporate Codes. See Corporations Act 2001 s 180 (Austl.); Joan Gabel et al.,
Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the Implications for D&O Liability: The
United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 365, 398 (2010) (discussing how
Australia’s code utilizes the business judgment rule).
88
Id.
89
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) (Ger.).
86
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contrast is articulated principally through case law in the state of in90
corporation.
In the United States, attempts to implement a statutory busi91
ness judgment rule have been unsuccessful. In 1994, the American
Law Institute attempted to provide black letter law for the business
92
judgment rule in its Principles of Corporate Governance. The drafters of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act in 1998, however,
decided that it would not be desirable to “freeze the concept in a sta93
tute.” The business judgment rule in the United States thus remains
94
embedded in case law. The business judgment rule in most states
embodies a rebuttable presumption that management has acted: (i)
in good faith, (ii) in the best interest of the corporation and absent a
conflict of interest, (iii) on an informed basis, and (iv) for a proper
business purpose, which precludes extreme examples of waste of cor95
porate assets.
The German business judgment rule has five requirements:
(i) a business decision by management, (ii) for the benefit of the
corporation, (iii) no conflict of interest, (iv) based on sufficient in90

See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124. The state of incorporation is not necessarily the state where the company has its headquarters. Many large U.S. corporations are incorporated in Delaware.
91
Thomas J. Dougherty, Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies, SM086 A.L.I.–
A.B.A., 327, 339 (June 7–8, 2007) (discussing Delaware, which has not adopted a
business judgment rule statute, whereas forty-one states have passed statutes affecting
how judges can apply the business judgment rule). Similarly, in 2000, the British
Commission for the Reform of Company Law decided against the implementation of
a statutory business judgment rule. See COMPANY LAW REVIEW, MODERN COMPANY LAW
FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK § 3.69, at 42 (2000) available at ht tp://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23248.pdf. The British government in December 2003, again, attempted unsuccessfully the introduction of the U.S. business
judgment rule.
DEP’T TRADE & INDUS., DIRECTOR AND AUDITOR LIABILITY–A
CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT
§ 5.4–5.13, at 17–21 (2003), available at
http://www.treasurers.org/system/files/auditors_directors.pdf.
92
A.L.I PRIN. CORP. GOV. § 4.01 (1994).
93
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §8.31 cmt. 1 (2002). Interestingly, the business judgment rule is discussed in the Corporate Director’s Guide Book. See AM. BAR ASS’N,
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 25–27 (5th ed. 2007).
94
See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052
(Del. Ch. 1996); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Gimbel
v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery
Corp., 126 A. 46, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 1926).
95
See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988); Grobow
v. Perot, 539 A.2d at 187; Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 686 S.E.2d 425, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.
2009).
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formation, and—perhaps most important for the present analysis—
96
(v) a no “hazard” decision or no excessive risk taking. As pointed
out below, it is in this last element where the business judgment rules
in the United States and in Germany diverge the most. German law
presumes no hazard and excessive risk, but this presumption can be
rebutted. Law in the United States principally focuses on corporate
97
“waste” and presumes the absence of corporate “waste.” The principal factual inquiry asks whether that presumption can be rebutted.
Because most risk taking does not meet the definition of corporate
waste, a showing of hazard or excessive risk is insufficient to rebut the
98
business judgment rule in the United States.
B. The German Approach to the Business Judgment Rule
Although many of the elements of the business judgment rule
are similar in the United States and Germany, we briefly summarize
the German approach which is unfamiliar to most American readers.
1.

Business Decision of Management

A primary predicate of the business judgment rule is that
99
management made a business decision. A business decision under
the business judgment rule requires that management could act one
100
The business
way or another in a given situation or not act at all.
decision must be a discretionary one for the business judgment rule
to apply. There is no discretion if the decision was required by a duty
101
of the officer or director under laws, bylaws, or contracts. If the of96
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2); Marcus Lutter, Die Business Judgment Rule und ihre praktische
Anwendung, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW]
841, 843–45 (2007) (Ger.).
97
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must shoulder
the burden of proving that the exchange was so one sided that no
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration. A claim of waste will
arise only in the rare, unconscionable case where directors irrationally
squander or give away corporate assets. This onerous standard for
waste is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless
it cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
98
See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
99
See Lutter, supra note 96, at 843.
100
See id.
101
HOLGER FLEICHER, HANDBUCH DES VORSTANDRECHTS 258 (2006) (Ger.).
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ficer or director breached a specific duty or acted illegally, he or she
has not acted with discretion and the business judgment rule does
not apply. For instance, there is no discretion for management to
usurp a business opportunity of the corporation, emit chemical substances into public waters despite a legal ban, or neglect the disclo102
sure of material information as required by law. If the officer or director did not act with discretion, the actions of management are not
covered by the business judgment rule.
The U.S. business judgment rule does not require a business
“decision” of management per se as a necessary element of the rule.
It is implied, however, that management acted or the rule would not
be at issue. Other elements of “discretion” in the U.S. business
judgment rule fall under specific components of the rule (i.e. the directors acting for a “proper business purpose”). A doctrinal definition of “acting” does not seem to be necessary—or at least is not emphasized—in the United States.
2.

For the Benefit of the Corporation

In Germany, the second element of the business judgment
rule requires managers to reasonably believe they acted exclusively
103
for the benefit of the corporation. For instance, management does
not act for the benefit of the corporation if its actions threaten the
existence and economic survival of the corporation because, in those
circumstances, management cannot reasonably expect to act for the
104
benefit of the corporation. Or, if a parent company forces a subsidiary in a group structure to make permanent changes that lead to cost
inefficiencies and economic decline of the subsidiary, such actions
would not be for the benefit of the subsidiary although they technically may be permitted under German group structure law.
Similarly, the U.S. business judgment rule presumes that
105
management intended to act in the best interest of the corporation.
In the United States, however, this component of the rule is construed principally to mean an absence of conflict of interest—that the
managers were acting in the best interests of the corporation and not
102

Lutter, supra note 96, at 843.
ARAG/GARMENBECK, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshoffs in Zivilsachen
[BGHZ] [Federal court of Justice], Apr. 21, 1997, 135, 244, 253 (Ger.). Before the
Court articulated the German business judgment rule, the highest German Civil
Court in 1930 already had required that the director’s decision must be for the benefit of the corporation. See id.
104
Lutter, supra note 96, at 844.
105
See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch.
2009).
103
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another person or entity other than the corporation. Provided the
directors have no demonstrable personal conflict of interest or a conflict of interest from another corporation or some third party whose
interests are being furthered at the expense of the corporation, they
107
are presumed to be acting for the corporation’s best interests. U.S.
courts generally do not inquire into whether managers acted in a
manner that threatened the economic survival of the corporation, although managers may not engage in a complete waste of corporate
assets (disposition of assets without receiving anything of value in return) and may not make some managerial decisions—such as stock
buybacks—in circumstances where the corporation is in fact already
108
insolvent.
3.

No Conflicts of Interest

A third requirement of the German business judgment rule is
that directors and officers cannot act in circumstances that would
amount to a conflict of interest. A classic example of a conflict of interest in this context is a CEO of a corporation who desires to hire his
109
wife for a radio advertisement of a company product.
Unless the
wife obtains a contract with provisions that would be in line with custom and industry standards or other precedent, the decision to hire
the wife may be a conflict of interest transaction. Interestingly, this
requirement has no foundation in either the ARAG decision by the
110
Bundesgerichtshof or in the code-based version of the German
111
business judgment rule. German academic literature, however,
concludes that management decisions that were made while a conflict of interest existed cannot fulfill the requirement that manage112
ment acted exclusively for the benefit of the corporation. This view
113
is in accordance with the legislative intent behind the AktG.

106

See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id.
108
See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049.
109
This case arose in U.S. courts. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1944).
110
See BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.).
111
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2).
112
See supra Part IV.B.2 (second requirement of the German Business Rule).
Holger Fleischer, Die “Business Judgment Rule”: Vom Richterrecht zur Kodifizierung, 9
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW] 685, 691
(2004) (Ger.).
113
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des
Anfechtungsrechts [UMAG] [BR] 3/05, at 20 (Ger.).
107
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The business judgment rule in the United States also requires
114
that directors not act out of a conflict of interest. Indeed, showing
a conflict of interest is probably the most common way of rebutting
the business judgment rule presumption in the United States.
4.

Based on Sufficient Information

The requirement that directors and officers have sufficient information before they act is a crucial element of the German business
115
judgment rule. The sufficiency of information depends on the significance of the pending business decision. For instance, if management decides to purchase a new computer for the office, it may be
sufficient that management obtain competing offers from different
vendors. More extensive information including market research reports, due diligence, and fairness opinions, among other documentation, are required if management of a German corporation decides
116
to acquire a foreign company.
This requirement is based on the
understanding that if the corporation is not protected by the personal liability of the individual board members who act on its behalf,
then the decisions of board members must be planned well and
based on sufficient information in order to protect the corporation
117
from the implicit risks.
The German legislature has extended the protection of the
business judgment rule to corporate managers’ selection and weighing of information, an approach which avoids “hindsight bias” of
118
judges.
The legislature reasoned that time pressure in decisionmaking ought to be taken into account and may justify collecting less
119
information before making a business decision. Other criteria are
profitability of a business decision, risk parameters, amount of in-

114

See Bayer v. Beran, N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The ‘business
judgment rule’, however, yields to the rule of undivided loyalty . . . . Such personal
transactions of directors with their corporations, such transactions as may tend to
produce a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary obligation, are, when
challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care, and if there is any evidence of
improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness or undue advantage, the
transactions will be voided.”).
115
BGHZ 135, 244, 253 (Ger.).
116
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court], June 22, 2006, BETRIEBS
BERATER [BB] 66, 2007 (Ger).
117
Lutter, supra note 96, at 844.
118
Fleischer, supra note 101, at 686.
119
Lutter, supra note 96, at 845.
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vestment, and financing requirements, as they may impact business
120
decisions immediately.
In the United States, this component of the business judgment rule is often articulated as a requirement that the director acted
121
on an “informed basis.” A business decision must be based on suffi122
cient information. This requirement, however, is watered down in
the United States by many states that allow corporations to adopt
charter provisions that exculpate the directors from liability to the
corporation for breach of a duty of care, including the duty to act on
123
an informed basis.
5.

No Excessive Risk Taking—No Hazard Decision

Finally, excessively risky decisions by directors that may lead to
the demise of the corporation are not protected by the German busi124
ness judgment rule. The Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH (the highest
German court in civil matters), confirmed that a “hazard decision” by
management is not protected by the business judgment rule if “the
ability to take conscious business risks by management has been ir125
responsibly overstretched.”
The application of this component of
the business judgment rule in an environment of increased systemic
126
The BGH in its
risk, such as the recent credit crisis, is unclear.
127
ARAG decision determined that the German business judgment
128
rule will not cover informed business decisions by management if
129
“conscious business risk has been inappropriately excessive” —i.e.,
no manager, regardless of whether the manager is a bank officer or
board member, acts reasonably if he or she takes on risks on behalf of
the corporation that, if realized, will result in the demise of the cor130
poration.
There is no equivalent to this component in the U.S. business
judgment rule. One could argue that if directors act on an informed
120

Id.
See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (2009).
122
See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (1985).
123
See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7) (2010); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/2.10(b)(3) (West 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. 14A:2-7(3) (West 2010).
124
Lutter, supra note 96, at 845.
125
BGHZ 135, 244, 253 (Ger.).
126
See generally Lutter, supra note 96.
127
BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.); ZIP 883 (Ger.).
128
Now embodied in Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept.
6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) (Ger.).
129
BGHZ 135, 244, 253(Ger.); ZIP 883, 886 (Ger.).
130
Lutter, supra note 5, at 199.
121
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basis, as required by the U.S. business judgment rule, they should at
least know about the risks the company takes and monitor those risks.
However, in an opinion that provided the first detailed analysis of potential liability of directors for losses incurred as a result of substantial
exposure to subprime debt, the Delaware Court of Chancery held
131
otherwise.
In In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld the business judgment rule and its protection of directors’ business decisions in the face of worldwide economic losses, finding that directors’ duties to monitor for illegal
132
conduct in some situations under the Caremark line of cases would
133
not be extended to impose oversight liability for business risk.
Shareholder plaintiffs alleged (1) breach of fiduciary duties for failing to properly monitor and manage the risk that Citigroup faced
concerning problems in the subprime lending market, and (2) failure to properly disclose the company’s exposure regarding subprime
134
assets. According to the complaint, starting in May 2005, “red flags”
should have immediately alerted the defendants to problems in the
135
real estate and credit markets. Therefore, by ignoring these warning signs, the defendants allegedly overemphasized short-term profits
136
and sacrificed the long-term viability of Citigroup. According to the
Delaware Chancery court, however, oversight liability can only be established if the plaintiff can show that “the directors knew that they
were not discharging their fiduciary [duties] or that the directors
137
demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities . . . .”
Inability to predict the future and an incorrect evaluation of business
risk were not violations of a director’s oversight responsibilities. Risk
is inherent in maximizing shareholder value, and losses in and of
themselves do not suffice to hold directors personally liable for taking
risks that lead to losses.
In contrast with In re Citigroup, the German Bundesgerichtshof, more than ten years earlier in 1997, elaborated in its ARAG decision that business decisions by directors are not protected by the

131

See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139–40 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
132
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (expanding the directors’ duty of care to include a duty to monitor for illegal conduct).
133
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A2d 362 (2006) (reaffirming the Caremark duties).
134
In re Citigroup Inc., at 111.
135
Id. at 114.
136
Id. at 111.
137
Id. at 123.

KAAL PAINTER_FINAL_11.10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

CONSTRAINTS ON RISK TAKING

11/16/2010 12:33 PM

1467

German business judgment rule if “business risk was inappropriately
138
excessive.”
In the context of the 2008 credit and banking crisis,
German commentators—relied upon by courts more extensively than
their counterparts are in the United States—have concluded that no
manager acts reasonably in terms of the business judgment rule if he
or she takes risks on behalf of the corporation that, if realized, result
139
in the demise of the corporation.
As of this writing it is unclear
how courts will apply this concept to the events of the 2008 financial
crisis. In particular, it remains to be seen how much influence hindsight bias will have on judicial decisions regarding which risks are
covered by the German business judgment rule. For example, will
the fact that a particular risk led to the demise of a corporation be
sufficient to abrogate the business judgment rule protection of managers’ decision to take that risk, or will German courts instead examine the decision ex-ante and assess whether the managers could
reasonably have foreseen the risk as likely to cause the corporation’s
demise?
C. Securities Disclosure
One way of addressing excessive risk taking is to require that
it be disclosed to a financial institution’s stockholders, bondholders,
and other investors so they can decide for themselves how much risk
is too much. Investors who are told about risk and think it is unwise
can sell their investments. They can vote out directors who allow
managers to assume too much risk, or they can pressure managers to
change their approach to risk. For investors to have an opportunity
to take these steps, they must know about the risk. In a mandatory
disclosure regime, the law requires that a minimum amount of information be publicly disclosed. Securities fraud laws also forbid material misrepresentations about risk and other facts that an investor
140
would consider important in making a decision.
Both the United States and Germany require public companies to disclose information about their financial condition to shareholders. Here, however, the United States probably has the stricter
requirements as well as the more vigorous enforcement regime. Part
of the difficulty for German securities disclosure is that Germany has,
to some extent, waited for the European Union (EU) to develop a
138

BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.).
See Lutter, supra note 5, at 199.
140
See TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 441–43 (1976); see also Basic Inc
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–232 (1988) (setting forth this definition of “materiality”).
139
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comprehensive approach to disclosure, and the EU is still working
toward coordination in corporate disclosure requirements. The EU
141
has no central agency for securities regulation, and there is no centralized system like the EDGAR Database of Online Corporate Finan142
cial Information for continuous disclosure of pertinent information
to investors. Only recently have European countries introduced
143
mandatory and continuous issuer disclosure.
Such disclosure in
Europe is often self-regulated rather than enforced by a government
144
The European Parliament and the European Commisregulator.
sion have attempted to address disparate regulation and lack of enforcement in individual European member states by adopting the
145
146
Market Abuse Directive, the Transparency Directive, the Markets
147
148
in Financial Instruments Directive, and the Prospectus Directive.
149
Despite many improvements, the directives do not mandate coherent and comprehensive disclosure, and issuers continue to make
150
disclosures in disparate ways. Some scholars have argued that there
151
European investors continue to
is a need for a European SEC.
struggle to find material information about European companies,

141

The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) is an independent
committee of European Union member states’ securities regulators, but it has no enforcement powers. See CESR, http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&
mac=0&id=) (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
142
EDGAR Database of Online Corporate Financial Information, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
143
See Iris H-Y Chiu, Delegated Regulatory Administration in Mandatory Disclosure—
Some Observations from EU Securities Regulation, 40 INT’L LAW. 737, 737 (2006).
144
See id. at 746.
145
Council Directive 2003/6, art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC).
146
Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC).
147
Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
148
Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC).
149
Generally, the improvement has occurred in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. See François P. Haas, The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive:
Banking on Market and Supervisory Efficiency 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 07/250, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1087165.
150
See Chiu, supra note 143, at 767–68.
151
See generally Yannis Avgerinos, The Need and the Rationale for a European Securities
Regulator, in FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A SINGLE REGULATOR 83 (Mads
Andenas & Yannis Avgerinos eds., 2003); Gilles Thieffry, The Case for a European Securities Commission, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
211 (Ellís Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart eds., 2001); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case
for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 9 (1999); Eric Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a European Securities Regulator, 34
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499 (2003).
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and even if they find appropriate sources, the information may be in152
complete.
Given the state of securities regulation in Europe, European
investors arguably are more exposed to securities fraud than U.S. investors. On the other hand, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed a
substantial amount of risk in U.S. issuers that was not disclosed to investors. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy alone revealed two serious
disclosure lapses for a U.S. company. The first was the “Repo 105”
transaction whereby Lehman “sold” poorly performing assets to a
London bank for cash at the end of each quarter; the assets were valued at 105% of the cash payment, which apparently qualified the
153
transaction as a sale under English law.
The cash was used to pay
154
down Lehman’s debt and improve its balance sheet. Coupled with
the sale was a “repurchase” commitment from Lehman whereby a few
days after the end of the quarter the transaction was reversed and the
same assets were bought back from the bank for cash which Lehman
155
again borrowed, increasing its debt.
The same transaction was repeated at the end of the next quarter, allowing each quarter’s finan156
cial statements to show less debt than Lehman actually had.
The
total amount of money involved may have been as much as $50 bil157
The second disclosure lapse involved a “captive company”
lion.
called Hudson Castle, which was set up by former Lehman Brothers
152

See Chiu, supra note 143, at 767–68.
Although Europe has seen increased securities regulation recently with
the adoption of the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive,
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, and the Transparency
Directive, the problem with these new rules is that issuers are still permitted to make disclosures in disparate ways. This means that investors
may not be able to find material information on companies in which
they invest, and even if they do, the information they find may be incomplete.
Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41
INT’L. LAW. 1121, 1128 (2007) (citing Iris H-Y Chiu, supra note 143, at 767). However, Europe-wide uniform securities prospectus rules are expected to improve disclosure requirements in Europe. See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Internationalization of World Capital Markets–Multinational Enterprises, 10 INT.’L CAP. MARKETS &
SEC. REG. § 2:3 n.66 (2010) (“[T]he EEC Commission’s proposed European-wide
uniform securities prospectus rules will greatly facilitate the disclosure and dissemination of information necessary for investor protection and informed investment decisions, and should ease regulatory restrictions currently precluding foreign access to
domestic capital markets.”).
153
Report of Anton R. Valukas supra note 32, at 6–7.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 6.
156
Id. at 6–7.
157
Id. at 6.

KAAL PAINTER_FINAL_11.10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2010 12:33 PM

1470

[Vol. 40:1433

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

employees specifically for the purpose of buying poorly performing
assets from Lehman; Hudson Castle’s close association with Lehman
158
was not disclosed. Hudson nonetheless showed up at the Lehman
bankruptcy claiming billions of dollars of obligations owed to it by
159
Lehman.
These and other examples, including the Enron and
WorldCom failures in 2001 and 2002, illustrate potential weakness in
the supposedly rigorous U.S. disclosure regime. Public companies
that engage in highly complex transactions as a matter of course can
easily conceal risky transactions from investors. Indeed, management
can also conceal these transactions from the company’s own direc160
tors.
Although financial institutions in Germany also engage in
highly complex transactions, to the extent financial innovation in the
United States is ahead of that in Germany, the U.S. disclosure regime
may be more vulnerable to misrepresentation and fraud.
The one aspect of U.S. securities laws that is substantially
harsher than its German counterpart is the private litigation regime
in which investors sue in class actions for securities fraud. In securities class actions, U.S. law allows plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of
the “fraud on the market theory” rather than requiring plaintiffs to
161
prove actual reliance on misleading statements. This approach has
162
been rejected in most other countries. The application of Section
163
164
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in conjunction with the fraud on the market theory makes it relatively easy
to certify a plaintiff class for litigation and thus substantially increases
165
the potential liability of issuers. Lawyers who file unsuccessful lawsuits in the United States are not liable for the defendants’ attorneys’
fees, yet fee awards for successful plaintiffs’ lawyers are very generous,
158

See Louise Story & Eric Dash, Lehman Channeled Risks Through ‘Alter Ego’ Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at A1. Lehman did not have a sufficient equity interest in
Hudson Castle to require consolidation of the two companies’ balance sheets under
GAAP.
159
Id.
160
The bankruptcy examiner for Lehman Brothers found that the company’s outside directors had not breached their fiduciary duty to the company because they
apparently had never been told about the above transactions and other problems
with Lehman’s exposure to risk. Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 32, at 54–58.
161
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
162
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 61–62 (2007).
163
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2006).
164
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
165
See Cristof Aha & Jens Föderer, Die RocheEntscheidung des U.S. Court of Appeals,
49 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 450, 455 (2003) (Ger.).
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166

sometimes running into the billions of dollars. Although Congress
significantly tightened up pleading requirements, limited damages,
and took other pro-defendant steps in the 1995 Private Securities Lit167
igation Reform Act, the United States remains the most attractive
168
regime in the world for class action securities litigation.
Indeed,
foreign plaintiffs have sought to use U.S. courts to sue foreign defendants over securities purchased outside the United States (so-called fcubed litigation) until the U.S. Supreme Court decided in June 2010
that U.S. securities laws do not cover securities bought or sold outside
169
the United States. In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress almost immediately thereafter
gave the SEC the authority to pursue conduct in the United States
170
that defrauds investors outside the United States. It is unclear how
the SEC will use this authority and how much cooperation there will
be between the SEC and securities regulators in Germany and elsewhere in combating securities fraud.
In Germany, class actions for securities fraud are virtually
nonexistent. Unlike many of its European neighbors, Germany has
elected to provide for group litigation only in a few substantive law
areas, such as environmental law, and in most group litigation cases,
171
German law only provides for injunctive relief.
Section 148(1) of
the German Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, or AktG), however, was
amended by the German legislature in 2005 as part of the Integrity of
Corporations and Modernization Act (Gesetz zur Unternehmensin-

166

See Jay N. Varon, Promoting Settlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the
Offer of Judgment: Some Suggestions for Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 813,
818–19 (1984) (noting that the dichotomy between winning plaintiff who is eligible
for attorneys’ fees and the defendant who not is eligible favors plaintiff’s decisions
not to settle).
167
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
168
Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through
Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 609 (2010) (discussing hindrances to capital
formation as a result of the fact that the United States is one of few developed nations to allow class action securities litigation).
169
See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). For commentary on the dangers facing European companies in the context of Morrison and pending changes in the U.S. Congress, see Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law—Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for
European Securities Litigation?, 7 EUR. CO. L. 90 (2010).
170
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203 § 929P(c)(2) (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
171
Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 355, 358 (2001).
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tegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts 2005, or
172
UMAG). Section § 148(1) of the AktG, as amended by the UMAG,
introduces the derivative suit in Germany and gives minority share173
holders the right to sue management in certain circumstances.
This may be perceived as a tightening of the standard of care in
Germany as it introduced the possibility for shareholders to sue on
behalf of the corporation for wrongdoing of management. Unlike
the derivative suit in the United States, however, section 148(1) of the
AktG requires a threshold ownership of shares totaling €100,000
(about $127,090) for shareholders to have standing to sue on behalf
174
of the corporation in German courts. This ownership requirement
for derivative suits is arguably counter-balanced by the introduction
of other methods of recovering against directors, such as the 2009
Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) provisions for liability and compensation reduction that are discussed be175
low.
172

Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts [UMAG] [Law on Company Integrity and Modernization of the Right to
Appeal], Sept. 22, 2005, BGBL. I at 2802 (Ger.).
173
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I
at 1089, § 148(1). (Ger.).
Proceedings for Admission of Legal Action:
Shareholders whose shares amount to a total of one hundredth of the
share capital or a pro rata amount of 100,000 euros on the date of filing an application, may apply for a claim for damages accruing to the
company to be admitted in their own name as specified under §
147(1), first sentence. The court will admit such claim if:
1. the shareholders furnish evidence that their shares were acquired prior to the date on which they, or in the event of
universal succession their predecessor, should have become
aware of the alleged violation of obligations or the alleged
damages following public disclosure of the same,
2. the shareholders furnish evidence that they have, to no
avail, set a reasonable deadline for the company to file a
claim in its own name
3. there are facts which justify the suspicion that the company
has incurred damages as a result of dishonesty or gross
breach of the law or of the company’s articles of association,
and
4. there are no prevailing interests on the part of the company
providing grounds to prevent enforcement of the claim.
Id., translated in Dieter Hahn, Aktiengesetz, RELATIV-KOMFORTABEL, http://www.relativkomfortabel.de/148aktg.php, http://www.relativ-komfortabel.de/sec-148aktg.php.
174
Id.
175
See Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [VorstAG] [Act on the
Appropriateness of Executive Board Compensation], Aug. 31, 2009, BGBL. I, at 2509
(Ger.), available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/3516/Formulierungshilfe%20
Gesetz%20zur%20Angemessenheit%20der%20Vorstandsverguetung.pdf.
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In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to
risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the United States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime
and robust securities class action litigation regime. Managers are
permitted to incur many of the risks that they want to incur, and
courts applying the business judgment rule in the United States give
little or no consideration to the overall health of the company or
even whether the risk is jeopardizing the company’s very existence. If
the risk is not sufficiently disclosed to investors, however, the directors are likely to be sued under the securities laws. Directors thus
may monitor for risk because they know they are responsible for disclosing it. Turning back to the graph earlier in this Article, substantive corporate law standards in the United States push the risk monitoring requirement toward leniency (toward the left on the graph),
but the relatively robust securities disclosure rules, SEC enforcement
procedures, and civil litigation regime shift the risk monitoring re176
quirement back toward stringency (to the right on the graph).
But the U.S. disclosure regime does not always work well, as illustrated by what happened at Lehman Brothers and other companies. This could be for a number of reasons: the risks incurred were
too complex and investors did not understand what was being disclosed, investors ignored disclosures and instead relied on rating
agencies when valuing debt securities, directors did not understand
the risks enough to know whether they were being properly disclosed,
disclosure rules were easy to circumvent as in the case of Lehman’s
Repo 105, the SEC failed in its oversight responsibility, and/or because the SEC had no oversight responsibility over security-based
swaps and similar financial instruments that Congress had earlier ex177
plicitly prohibited the SEC from regulating. The much-touted U.S.
securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis,
yet the expansive U.S. version of the business judgment rule in corporate law that allowed the risk taking to begin with has remained intact.
Against this backdrop, Germany and other countries that have
used corporate law to control excessive risk taking may be skeptical of

176

See supra Part II.
Earlier prohibitions on SEC enforcement are codified in the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(b)(2) (2006), and the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c1(b)(2) (2006), which state that security-based swap agreements are not securities for
purposes of the securities laws and explicitly prohibiting the SEC from requiring registration of security-based swaps or even from taking proactive measures to prevent
fraud in security-based swaps.
177
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the traditional U.S. approach that allows almost any risk to be taken
as long as it is disclosed.
D. Other Recent developments
The German approach to business risk continues to evolve.
178
The ARAG case, in which the German High Court (Bundesgerich179
tshof) decided that the German business judgment rule will not
cover informed business decisions by management if “conscious
180
business risk has been inappropriately excessive,” had a significant
impact on the debate in Germany. Until recently, the debate was rather theoretical and dogmatic and the general public was not in181
volved.
Now that scandals with risk taking by management have
182
had an impact on the economy, the general public is more aware of
178

BGHZ 135, 244(Ger.); ZIP, 883 (Ger).
The German business judgment rule is now embodied in Aktiengesetz [AktGg]
[German Stock Corporations Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, at § 93(I)(2)
(Ger.).
180
BGHZ 135, 244, 253(Ger.); ZIP 883, 886 (Ger.).
181
See generally Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European Takeover Law—
Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 353, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=247214
(discussing a suggested alteration of the German business judgment rule).
182
For a general discussion of the problems of German banks in the context of
the credit crisis, see Peter Gumbel, Subprime on the Rhine, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at
71; Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor & Ian McDonald, Global Scale: Impact of Mortgage Crisis Spreads—How Subprime Mess Ensnared German Bank—IKB Gets a Bailout,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1. In the case of IKB Deutsche Industriebank, a banker in this mid-sized bank invested one-third of available funds in foreign and mostly
unknown shares. Lutter, supra note 5, at 199. IKB Deutsche Industriebank announced a total loss of $954 million from its exposure to the subprime crisis on July
27, 2007 and the ECB joined the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) to form a consortium of major German banks to raise $4.789 billion for a bailout of IKB. Kara M.
Westercamp, A Crack in the Façade and the Whole Building Came Tumbling Down: A Critical Examination of the Central Banks’ Response to the Subprime Mortgage Loan Crisis and
Global Financial Market Turmoil, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 219 (2009).
In the case of Sachsen LB, a Banker invested three times the value of the State budget of the state of Saxony in foreign and mostly unknown shares. Lutter, supra note 5,
at 199. Less than three weeks after IKB’s bailout, SachsenLB reported similar problems and forced a consortium of banks to provide a credit line of $17.3 billion to stabilize Sachsen’s exposures. Id. For a summary of German cases in banking crisis, see
Lutter, supra note 5, at 199; Dam, supra note 4, at 609–11 (elaborating on the effects
of the subprime crisis on German banks including IKB).
This German example illustrates the more general phenomenon that
at least some European banks seized the opportunity to sell subprime
securities backed by US mortgage loans and that European financial
institutions used SIVs and conduits in much the same manner as American financial institutions. Thus, it would be wrong to assume that regulatory reform is primarily about changes required in US law or that
these changes would affect operations of only US banks.
179
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183

the dangers of financial risk.
To address public concerns about management risk taking,
the German legislature adopted the Act on the Appropriateness of
Management Board Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der
184
Vorstandsvergütung, or VorstAG) on August 5, 2009. Recognizing
that “managers who emphasize short-term parameters in management lose sight of the long-term benefit of the corporation and are
185
incentivized to take irresponsible risks,” the VorstAG requires a reduction of management board compensation if the corporation is in
186
The Act also introduces personal liability of management
a crisis.
187
by way of a deductible for D&O insurance as well as personal liability of members of the Supervisory Board for failure to appropriately
188
determine management compensation.
The VorstAG’s attempt to limit risk taking by introducing personal liability for managers caused heightened media interest in
189
these regulatory measures. To encourage long-term decision making by management, the VorstAG requires that the performancebased part of management compensation, such as options, are payable four years after the respective manager was granted such op190
tions.
It also introduces a two-year hiatus between transitioning
from management to supervisory board positions at the same com191
pany. Moreover, a tentative proposal to reform the German insolvency law, the Restructuring of Systemically Important Credit Institutions Act (Gesetz zur Einführung einer Restrukturierungsverwaltung,

Dam, supra note 4, at 610.
183
Koalition verschärft Haftung von Managern, DIE WELT, Apr. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/article3613357/Koalition-verschaerft-Haftung-vonManagern.html (Ger.).
184
VorstAG, supra note 175, at A–B.
185
Id. at A (Problem und Ziel).
186
Id. at Art. 1(b).
187
The VorstAG changed section 93(2)(3) of the German Corporation Act
(AktG). Pursuant to the new version of that section, a corporation that provides insurance coverage to the members of the Vorstand for risks resulting from their occupational activities, a mandatory deductible that is personally born by the member of
the Vostand must be included. The value of the deductible ranges from a minimum
of 10% of the damage up to the minimum amount of 1.5 times the annual base salary of the respective member of the Vorstand. Id. at Art 1(2).
188
Id. at Art. 1(3).
189
See generally Koalition verschärft Haftung von Managern, supra note 183.
190
Id.
191
Id. The hiatus does not apply to members of management who were elected to
the Aufsichtsrat by a vote of more than 25% of shareholders of the corporation.
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or Restrukturierungsverwaltungsgesetz—RestrVG), would allow a
newly created German authority to dismiss management of a finan193
cial institution if the institution is insolvent and if it is systemically
194
important to restructure the institution. At the time of publication
of this Article, it was unlikely that the German government would
enact the RestrVG.
The combination of the 2010 sovereign debt crisis and the
2008 credit crisis has undermined confidence in the functioning of
financial markets. Regulations in Germany and in the EU will likely
focus not only on financial institutions and their managers but also
on financial markets. One measure intended to ensure the integrity
of financial markets in Germany and the EU was the prohibition of
naked short sales by the German Finance Ministry in coordination
with the German Securities and Markets Authority (Bundesanstalt für
195
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht—BaFin).
The prohibition is, however, limited to trading in naked shorts of shares of a select group of
196
banks, insurance companies, and financial market intermediaries.
The German Finance Ministry recently proposed a new Act to extend
the time limit for the prohibition of naked short sales, thus making it
197
permanent. The Ministry also proposed to extend the scope of the
198
prohibition.

192
Gesetz
zur
Einführung
einer
Restrukturierungsverwaltung
[Restrukturierungsverwaltungsgesetz—RestrVG] [Restructuring of Systemically Important
Credit
Institutions
Act],
available
at
http://www.jura.uniduesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/Restrukturierung.pdf (Ger).
193
Id. § 2(1)(a)–(c). This is a similar approach to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Insolvency law.
194
Id. § 2(1)–(2). The German approach is different from the U.S. approach in
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Insolvency law in that it requires a systemic element or systemic relevance (in German, Systemrelevanz).
195
See Verbot für Leerverkäufe verlängert, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (Mar. 31,
2009), available at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Wirtschaft__und
__Verwaltung/Geld__und__Kredit/002__Bafin__Leerverkauf.html (Ger.).
Short
selling is the practice of selling securities or assets that have previously been borrowed from a third party with the intention of buying identical assets or securities at
a later date to return to the lender. A naked short, on the other hand, describes the
practice of short-selling a security without first borrowing such security or ensuring
that the security can be borrowed.
196
Id. The entities included: “Aareal Bank AG, Allianz SE, AMB Generali Holding
AG, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Börse AG, Deutsche Postbank
AG, Hannover Rückversicherung AG, Hypo Real Estate Holding SG, MLP AG,
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG.” Id.
197
See Regierungsentwurf für ein Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegen missbräuchliche Wertpapierund Derivategeschäfte, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (Feb.6, 2010), available at
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_54/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung
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In addressing these problems, however, Germany must contend with the EU. These German initiatives were instituted without
199
consulting its European neighbors. In response to this action, the
EU Commission proposed legislation that would curtail the ability of
individual EU member states to unilaterally prohibit certain instru200
ments.
Under this proposed legislation, before regulators in individual EU member states can unilaterally put such measures in place,
regulators must consult the European Securities and Markets Author201
ity (ESMA) and other EU member states. The proposed EU legislation would also give powers to EU member state authorities to restrict
202
or ban credit-default swaps subject to coordination by ESMA.

/Finanz__und__Wirtschaftspolitik/Finanzpolitik/20100528-Leerverkaeufe.html?__
nnn=true (Ger.).
198
See id.
199
Reinhard Hönighaus, Kein Zockverbot mehr im Alleingang–BaFin soll Maßnahmen
gegen Leerverkäufe besser abstimmen–EU Gesetz im Herbst, FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, June
15, 2010, 16 (Ger.).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Press Release, Public Consultation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps,
U.N.
Press
Release
10/255
(June
14,
2010),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/255&format
=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The intent of the new rules is described as:
The intention is that the measures envisaged on short selling should:
- ensure Member States have the power to act to reduce systemic risks and risks to financial stability and market integrity arising from short selling and Credit Default Swaps,
- facilitate co-ordination between Member States and the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) in emergency situations;
- increase transparency on the short positions held by investors;
and
- reduce settlement risks linked with uncovered or naked short selling. . . .
The options envisaged can be grouped into three types:
- Powers for competent authorities to temporarily restrict or
ban short selling and Credit Default Swaps in emergency situations (subject to coordination by ESMA);
- Measures to increase transparency to regulators and the market about short selling positions, including those obtained
through the use of derivatives; and
- Measures to reduce settlement risks of uncovered or naked
short selling.
The options under consideration also foresee powers for competent
authorities to enforce the rules and the possibility of some limited exemptions (for market makers and shares whose principal market is outside the EU).
Id.
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In a move likely to affect both financial institutions and financial markets, the German government also proposed publishing stress
tests for banks in a unified and consolidated approach with other EU
203
member states.
Stress tests for banks are intended to assess how
204
well banks are prepared to deal with extreme market scenarios. A
stress test study was published last year in the United States, but bank205
ing institutions may have influenced it. While critics allege the publication of stress tests could lead to panic in EU capital markets, the
Spanish Federal Reserve has already announced its intent to publish
206
stress tests for banks.
The former grand coalition government of
Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany had opposed
207
the publication of such stress tests.
European banking regulators
208
The German banking
now perform stress tests on a regular basis.
industry opposed the publication of stress tests but most EU member
states seem to favor such publication on the premise that “stress tests
will show that Europe has an efficient mechanism to solve problems
209
in the financial sector.”
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed to disclose how banks perform on stress tests in order to ascertain that the financial system can
210
withstand shocks.
Recently, in an effort to reduce risk taking, the EU Parliament
approved new rules to curtail bankers’ bonuses and reinforce banks’
211
capital requirements.
Under these new rules, bonuses would be
203

Christine Mai, Sorge um Geldhäuser - Berlin koordiniert europaweite Bloßstellung der
TIMES
DEUTSCHLAND,
June
16,
2010,
available
at
Banken,
FIN.
http://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/:sorge-um-geldhaeuser-berlinkoordiniert-europaweite-blossstellung-der-banken/50128924.html (Ger.).
204
Id.
205
David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests: Skeptics Wonder Why There’s so
Much Optimism in Official Circles; Friday Is Day of Reckoning, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at
C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704720004
575377202517842246.html (discussing effectiveness of stress tests of European
banks).
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Ina Lockhart, Meike Schreiber & Christine Mai, Bund kommt Banken bei
TIMES
DEUTSCHLAND,
June
17,
2010,
Stresstests
entgegen,
FIN.
http://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/:ftd-bankentag-bund-kommtbanken-bei-stresstests-entgegen/50129578.html (Ger.).
210
See Tony Czuczka & Gregory Viscusi, EU Leaders Agree to Publish Results of Banks’
Performance on Stress Tests, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2010, 1:32 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=akJ9nzKi3ZMo&pos=4.
211
Press Release, European Parliament, European Parliament ushers in new era
for bankers’ bonuses (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
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linked to salaries and the cash portion of bonuses would be capped at
212
30% of the total amount or 20% for particularly high bonuses.
Bankers also risk losing the remainder of the bonus if the bank’s per213
formance erodes over three years following the bonus payment.
Under the new rules, banks that do not curtail the salaries of staff
“whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the bank or investment firm” will have to set aside more capital
214
to make up for the risk. Notably, there has not been a similar development in the United States.
In an attempt to prevent a recurrence of the recent financial
crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced new
worldwide liquidity and leverage standards in its new Basel III Capital
215
Accord.
All of the twenty-seven member countries have already
216
signed on to the new principles.
The new principles will require
217
218
banks to limit tier-one capital to 3% of un-weighted assets.
The
Committee also proposed that banks hold capital above the regulato-

news/expert/infopress_page/042-77908-186-07-28-907-20100706IPR77907-05-072010-2010-false/default_en.htm.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council,
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements
for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies, at 8 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market
/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/Leg_Proposal_Adopted_1307.pdf.
215
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE
BANKING SECTOR (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [hereinafter BIS
REPORT: STRENGTHENING THE BANKING SECTOR].
216
Brooke Masters, Basel Breakthrough in Drive to Tighten Rules on Global Banking,
FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at 1.
217
BIS REPORT: STRENGTHENING THE BANKING SECTOR, supra note 215, at 12 (“The
Committee therefore is announcing for consultation a series of measures to raise the
quality, consistency, and transparency of the regulatory capital base. In particular, it
is strengthening that component of the Tier 1 capital base which is fully available to
absorb losses on a going concern basis, thus contributing to a reduction of systemic
risk emanating from the banking sector.”).
218
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II
FRAMEWORK (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf [hereinafter BIS REPORT:
ENHANCEMENTS TO BASEL II]. See also Peter Miu, Bogie Ozdemire, & Michael Geisinger, Can Basel III Work? Examining the New Capital Stability Rules by the Basel Committee: A
Theoretical and Empirical Study of Capital Buffers, (Feb. 20, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556446 (“. . . . the Basel Committee has proposed that a
buffer range should be established above the minimum capital requirements such
that, if Tier 1 capital should fall into the buffer range, [Financial Institutions] would
be constrained in the total amount of discretionary earnings distributions.”).
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ry minimum by introducing capital buffers that will rise and fall in a
220
countercyclical manner. The minimum capital requirement is less
onerous than feared by the banking industry. Banks will not have to
221
publish their capital ratios until 2015 and will not have to comply
222
with the 3% minimum until the end of 2017. To avoid a repeat of
the Lehman Brothers collapse, however, regulators do want banks to
223
retain enough liquid assets to survive a 30-day crisis.
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) addresses risk taking by
banks and other large financial institutions by dramatically increasing
224
the degree of government supervision. The law evolved from earlier proposals, including Senator Charles Schumer’s (D-NY) proposed
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, which set out corporate go225
vernance standards, required shareholder input in board elec226
tions, and, most importantly, required a shareholder vote on execu227
tive compensation disclosures.
Schumer’s proposal also required
that each public company board of directors establish a risk commit228
tee. Such a risk committee would be comprised of independent directors and would be “responsible for the establishment and evalua229
Other legislative proposals
tion of risk-management practices.”
230
included the “TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009.” Bar219
Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary
Solutions for Capital and Liquidity, 2010 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS ISSUE 1, 10
(2010) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/45314422.pdf.
220
Id.
221
Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher
Global
Minimum
Capital
Standards
7
(Sept.
12,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf.
222
Id. at 2 (“In July [2010], Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a
minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the
results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the
first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018
based on appropriate review and calibration.”).
223
Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Remarks
at the Institute of International Finance 2010 Spring Meeting, The Basel Committee and
Regulatory Reform 6 (Jun. 11, 2010), http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100611.pdf
(“Banks must hold a stock of high-quality liquid assets that is sufficient to allow them
to survive a 30-day period of acute stress.”).
224
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111 (2010).
225
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
226
§ 4.
227
§ 3.
228
§ 5(e).
229
§ 5(e)(5)(A).
230
TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 384, 111th Cong. (2009).
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ney Frank (D-MA), the Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, introduced the act to harmonize and broaden executive
compensation standards applicable to companies accepting govern231
ment financial assistance. Representative Gary Peters (D-MI) introduced a more expansive version of the proposed law, the Sharehold232
er Empowerment Act of 2009, on June 12, 2009.
The Dodd-Frank Act that was eventually passed by Congress
and signed by the President includes many of these provisions in
233
thousands of pages of text. The Act is enormous and far-reaching,
and we point out here only a few of its most notable provisions. The
Act creates a new “super regulator,” the Financial Stability Oversight
Council, to oversee the financial industry and address future financial
234
crises.
The Council has the power to identify firms that threaten
235
stability and subject them to stricter oversight by the Federal Re236
serve. The Federal Reserve and the Council can break up firms that
have not responded to stricter oversight measures and continue to
237
pose a threat.
The Act also creates a new “resolution,” or orderly liquidation, authority in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) is given broad discretion to intervene between a financial in238
stitution and its creditors. Critics of the Act say that this institutio239
nalizes the bailout process. Whereas European countries, including
Germany, have been accustomed to a high degree of government intervention in the banking sector, including government ownership of
some banks, the Dodd-Frank Act represents an acknowledgment in
the United States that some financial institutions are too big to fail
and government oversight and wind-up authority cannot be limited
231
Deborah S. Prutzman, The Changing Roles of Directors as a Result of the Financial
Crisis, 1766 P.L.I. Corp. 85, 97 (2009).
232
H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (2009).
233
The rules promulgated under the Act will surely be thousands of more pages.
234
Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (2010).
235
§ 112(a)(1).
236
§ 113(a)(1).
237
§ 165(d)(5)(B).
238
See § 172.
239
See John B. Taylor, The Dodd-Frank Financial Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at
A19,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:
SB10001424052748703426004575338732174405398.html (suggesting that the Act
should have included reform of “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government
sponsored enterprises that encouraged the origination of risky mortgages” and
“reform of the bankruptcy code to allow large complex financial firms to go through
a predictable, rules-based Chapter 11 process without financial disruption and without bailouts”).
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to commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions. The U.S.
has rescued many large investment banks, insurance companies, investment funds, and other firms, and the Act seeks to make that
process more predictable and orderly.
The Act also creates a new federal entity, the Consumer Fi240
nancial Protection Bureau.
The Bureau regulates consumer lending, which was the origination point for much of the financial risk
241
taking that precipitated the 2008 crisis in the United States.
Consumer lending has been substantially less aggressive in Germany,
242
making this aspect of financial reform less urgent there. As pointed
out above, reckless borrowing by poorer EU member states was the
origination point in Europe for bad loans, and reform measures
there are likely to focus on that aspect of the problem rather than on
consumers.
The Dodd-Frank Act bestows on federal agencies broad regulatory authority over the trading of derivative securities and other fi243
nancial instruments that were also blamed for the financial crisis.
Regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market means that investors will trade many of these instruments, including credit-default
swaps, through an organized clearing system that is intended to provide more transparency and liquidity. The Act requires bank-holding
companies to spin off riskier derivatives trading into separate affili244
ates. Earlier drafts of the legislation had even more sharply curtailed the ability of financial institutions to trade in derivative securities for their own account, but these provisions were scaled back after
245
intensive lobbying by the banking industry.
Risky investment funds are another area of concern. The Act
restricts a banking entity from having an ownership interest in or be240

Dodd-Frank Act § 1011 (2010).
§ 1011(a). The Act, however, exempts loans originated by auto dealer from
the Bureau’s oversight. §1029
242
German Growth, Confidence Create Virtuous Circle, GULF TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010,
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=382337
&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28 (explaining private consumption driving
domestic demand has traditionally lagged in Germany); Christel Kucharz, German
Leaders Blame U.S. for Financial Crisis, WORLD VIEW (Sept. 25, 2008 7:58 AM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/worldview/2008/09/german-leaders.html (alluding to
German banks losing money on loans originating in United States).
243
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(7)(B)(i), § 610 (2010).
244
§ 608.
245
Banks Lobby Against Ban on Derivatives Trading, DEALBOOK (May 10, 2010),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/banks-lobby-against-derivativestrading-ban (discussing banking industry lobbyists convincing lawmakers to scale
back bill aspects negative to the industry).
241
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ing a sponsor of a private equity or hedge fund if such investments
amount to more than 3% of the bank’s Tier 1 capital or the bank’s
246
interest is more than 3% of the total ownership of the fund. Private
equity and hedge funds with assets under management of $150 mil247
lion or more will have to register with the SEC, although venture
248
capital funds will be exempt from full registration.
The Act also continues the federal government’s deep incursion into corporate governance that began in earnest with the Sar249
banes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Whereas Sarbanes-Oxley regulated the
250
composition and responsibilities of audit committees, the DoddFrank Act requires a broad range of financial services firms also to
251
The Act requires all publicly traded nonhave a risk committee.
bank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors of
252
the Federal Reserve System to have a risk committee. Also, all publicly traded bank-holding companies with assets of more than $10 bil253
lion must have a risk committee. The risk committee is responsible
for overseeing the firm’s risk management practices, and the committee must have at least one risk-management expert having experience
254
with similar firms. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
is empowered to decide how many independent directors must serve
255
on the committee. The introduction of the risk committee will be a
significant change because most boards now delegate risk oversight to

246

Dodd-Frank Act § 619(d)(4)(B)(ii) (2010).
§ 408(m)(2).
248
§ 407.
249
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
250
See, e.g., § 301.
251
See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h) (2010).
252
Id.
253
§ 165(h)(2)(A).
254
§ 165(h)(3).
255
§ 165(h)(3)(B). As pointed out earlier in this Article, the emphasis in U.S.
corporate law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and now the Dodd-Frank Act on independent
directors is not shared in many other countries, including Germany. Skeptics worry
that perhaps because of their lack of ties to the company, independent directors do
not have access to the information that they need to stop risks such as those that led
to the 2008 financial crisis. Bank Boards in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis, MOODY’S
INVESTORS SERVICE 6 (March 2010), available at http://www.directorship.com/media/
2010/03/Moodys-Bank-Boards-Mar-2010.pdf (discussing the importance of factors
other than board independence in attaining board effectiveness, namely size of
board); see generally David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives
for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281 (2004) (discussing how incentives structure relate
to effectiveness of independent directors).
247
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256

the audit committee.
This new committee could increase the size
of the board and perhaps result in hiring of new staff for the riskmanagement committee. This requirement also could result in more
litigation if the composition of the risk committee or its alleged failure to do its job appropriately becomes a basis for additional shareholder suits.
The Dodd-Frank Act is notable not only for its sheer length
and the enormous power it bestows on the federal government but
also for what it does not do. It does not break up the largest banks in
the United States, which would have been one approach to the “too
big to fail” problem. It does little to help smaller and regional banks
compete with the big banks. Because complying with regulation is
burdensome and expensive, the Act may have raised the barrier for
entry into the financial services industry. The Act does not restore
the separation of commercial banking from investment banking that
characterized the United States financial market before the repeal of
the Glass-Steagal Act in 1999, which many observers, including former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, recommended be res257
tored. In some ways, Dodd-Frank may make the United States more
similar to Germany and some other European countries that are
dominated by a few gigantic banks which are allowed to do both
commercial and investment banking but must also follow government dictates about what they can and cannot do.
V. CONCLUSION
In Germany, the introduction of the business judgment rule
in § 93(1)–(2) of the AktG could be indicative of a trend towards loosening the substantive standard of care. The imposition of an ownership requirement of €100,000 (about $127,090) for shareholders to
have standing to sue on behalf of the corporation in a derivative suit
in § 148(1) of the AktG makes at least this aspect of procedural rules
more favorable for defendant directors. These developments are
counterbalanced by the removal of some excessively risky decisions
from the business judgment rule protection in the ARAG decision
256

Hot Topics: What Might Companies Do about the Risk Elephant in the Room?,
DELOITTE 1 (October 2009), available at http://internalaudits.duke.edu/documents/
HotTopics_RiskElephant6_4_10.pdf (observing how less than 6% of one sample of
companies has board-level standing risk committees).
257
See Dodd-Frank Alert: Regulators Take Center Stage, DLA PIPER (2010),
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/dodd-frank-act-intro.pdf; Matthew Benjamin
& Christine Harper, Volcker Urges Dividing Investment, Commercial Banks (Update1),
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2009 11:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atSsZ5Fp8xuY&dbk.
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and some post-2008 developments, including the introduction of the
VorstAG, which requires personal liability of the Vorstand for taking
unusual risks and of the Aufsichtsrat for failure to appropriately determine management compensation. The German legislature also
seems inclined to prohibit market practices that it believes result in
excessive risk taking and potentially destabilized markets. The pending prohibition of naked shorts and credit-default swaps in Germany
and the EU illustrates this trend.
In the United States, Delaware courts have not explicitly imposed a duty to monitor risk. Because failure to disclose risk is a violation of federal securities laws, however, this may be a moot point.
Unmonitored risk is likely to be undisclosed risk. The Dodd-Frank
Act now introduces a mandatory risk committee. The Act also continues the trend in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act toward a federally mandated approach to corporate governance. The federal government is
prepared to tell financial services firms what they can and cannot do.
The government also has new powers to sort out the mess the next
time firms do not do what they are supposed to do or do it poorly.
In both Germany and the United States, there are likely to be
new substantive rules in response to what policy makers and the public believe to be excessive risk taking that led to the financial crisis. In
the United States in particular, tightening of the substantive rules
could also lead to more litigation. More government interference in
corporate governance is likely in both countries. It is unclear if the
resulting increase in monitoring costs will be offset by a decrease in
the costs of bad business decisions that are avoided because of the
new rules. Depending on the cost of additional litigation and government interference, the trade-off between the cost and the benefit
of imposing a duty to monitor risk on board members may or may
not be “worthwhile” from the company’s perspective, or even that of
society as a whole. Indeed, the company’s perspective may not matter
so much given the current political climate and concern about social
externalities of business failure. The severity of the substantive monitoring requirement and the procedures used to enforce it may increase regardless of net costs to the company.

